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MS. LITTELL: Good afternoon, welcome back. I'm glad so many
of you could continue to join us this afternoon.
Professor Ruti Teitel' will be moderating the panel entitled
"Identifying and Prosecuting War Crimes" which will include a
discussion of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Professor Teitel
has been instrumental in this symposium. She's the faculty co-chair
for the Journal of Human Rights and she is the "brains" behind this
entire symposium. I will now turn things over to her.
Professor Ruti Teitel
PROFESSOR RUTI TEITEL: That's Susan's modesty because really
it is the students Journal of Human Rights that are instrumental and
it is a collaboration.
Well, here we are at the end of what I think has been a very
inspiring day, at least I can say so for myself, and this last panel
promises to be, I think, a culmination in the sense that we are going
to pursue the contemporary efforts, the ones that are vital and on the
front pages of the New York Times today.
We have for the first panel a group that will explore some of
the issues and problems in the identification and prosecution of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity that we have
heard about today and the jurisprudence that was defined at
Nuremberg. The group of people that we have has promised to
explore these issues from a variety of different perspectives. I hope
this will be a provocative and even a controversial exchange. To
facilitate that, the panelists will speak about ten minutes and then we
Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.S., Georgetown University, 1977;
J.D., Cornell Law School, 1980.
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hope to have time for questions.
Let me begin with Mr. Graham Blewitt the deputy prosecutor
for the international tribunals that have been convened for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 2
Mr. Blewitt and I have met, however, in his former
incarnation when he was working in Australia for the Special
Investigations Unit that was in charge of the attempts to prosecute
Nazi war criminals who had resided in Australia.3 So his life story
epitomizes the comparative and historical analysis that we have talked
about today, which is the efforts to apply the post-war precedents
to war crimes and crimes against humanity today.4
Following Mr. Blewitt, Ambassador Bakuramutsa, who is the
permanent representative of Rwanda to the United States, will speak
and will explore with us the comparative advantages of the
international tribunal. After the Ambassador, Lt. Col. Steven Lepper
will speak. We are grateful to have a representative from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and, in particular, he will address some of the legal
issues he has been involved in. He is, in fact, one of the members
of the team that drafted proposed rules of procedure and evidence for
the tribunals that have been convened. Then we will hear from Mr.
O'Brien, who is advisor to Madeleine Albright at the United Nations
for the American perspective. Following that, we will have two
noted policy analysts from the human rights community, Stephanie
Grant from The Lawyers' Community on Human Rights and Juan
Mandez from Human Rights Watch, who was formally a lawyer in
Argentina and has been active in his representation of human rights
dissidents and prisoners and was himself a victim of the Argentine
government. So I think we have here a variety of perspectives and
I'm looking forward to the exchange. Perhaps we can begin with
Deputy Prosecutor Blewitt.
2 See,e.g. Leonard Doyle, Deputy for the Dead Closes In, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar.
15, 1994, at 9 (profiling Graham Blewitt as deputy prosecutor for the tribunals); Barbara
Franklin, A Tribunal Waiting for Work: , 81 A.B.A. J. 30, 30 (1995).
1 Graham Blewitt, Prosecuting World War II Persecutors: Efforts at an Era's End,
12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 199, 209-10 (1992).
1 See generally Australia: War Crimes and the Need to Ensure a Fair Trial, Feb. 3,
1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File (noting that the Special




MR. GRAHAM BLEWITT: Thank you very much. Let me say at
the outset as a war crime prosecutor just how honored I feel being at
this seminar today in the presence of so many of the Nuremberg
prosecutors. For me that is a great honor and I feel very privileged
to have been able to participate.
I'm also very encouraged to hear the words that have been
flowing from the panelists today, lending support to the idea of an
international criminal tribunal. I hope that I can add some notes of
optimism to the discussion. At the very outset, noting what the topic
of this panel is, namely, "Identifying and Prosecuting War Crimes"
with two case studies, Yugoslavia and Rwanda, I would like to add
a third example and that is Australia because I think it has some
relevance to what we are doing in Yugoslavia.
Very briefly, Australia got involved in the investigation and
prosecution of war crimes in the mid-1980'si After the war,
Australia received many hundreds of thousands of refugees, despite
persons from Europe, and amongst those were numerous war
criminals.6
The government, since the 1950's, had been sweeping the
issues under the carpet and finally, in the mid 1980's, it was decided
that the time had come to do something about it.7 The government
set up the Special Investigations Unit to investigate and prosecute war
criminals, and it amended the war crimes legislation to enable
prosecutions to take place in the ordinary criminal courts in Australia,
as if the crimes had been committed in Australia at that time.'
The Special Investigations Unit investigated allegations which
had been brought to its attention and during its life from 1987
through to January 1994 it investigated 840 cases.9 In prosecuting
5 See,e.g.,Hidden Legacy of the Fugitives from War, THE INDEPENDENT, July 6,
1992, at 5 (noting that Australia was one of the countries which passed war crimes
legislation in the 1980's).
6 See, e.g.,Richard Goldstone, Exposing Human Rights Abuses: A Help or Hindrance
to Reconciliation?, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 607, 610 (1995).
See e.g., Id.
8 See Blewitt, supra note 3, at 211.
9 Id.
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the cases that were brought, a number of things had to be proved.
First of all, it was necessary under the legislation to prove
that the Second World War actually occurred and that the parts under
investigation, namely the Soviet Union was, in fact, under
occupation. It was also necessary to prove that there was such a
thing as the "final solution", in other words, a genocide that had
occurred in relation to the European Jews.
In the cases that we prosecuted, we achieved the proof of that
by calling a number of historians, including Professor Raul Hilburg. 0
Through the historians we were able to establish that, indeed, there
was a war; that there was an occupation, and that the Germans
certainly had the policy to exterminate the Jews of Europe.
We were able in proving the latter point to produce original
captured documents. These documents were spread throughout the
various archives in the world, including those here in the United
States." One of the earliest panelists today, Robert Wolfe, was
actually called as a witness in Australia and he produced some of the
original documents held by his archive. That's how we established
the war and the policies that were being implemented.
To prove the involvement of the accused in the trials, we
relied upon direct evidence, and that was the evidence of eye
witnesses and through normal police detective methods, we were able
to trace, even after fifty years, survivors of the atrocities which
occurred in many cases.12
In addition, we had forensic evidence in the form of expert
evidence relating to the exhumation of mass graves.' 3 That evidence
provided proof that the mass executions were, in fact, performed by
the Germans and it confirmed what the eye witnesses had said, as to
the number, the sex and the ages of the victims. 4
As to who we were to prosecute, that decision was based on
10 See id. at 213 (noting that Professor Raul Hilberg was in Australia to give
historical testimony).
" Christian Tomuschat, International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of
Nuremberg Confirmed, 5 CRIM. L.F. 237, 243 (1994) (identifying various archives in
Germany and Japan as having contained the incriminating documents used as proof at
the Nuremberg trials).
11 See Blewitt, supra note 3, at 212.
'3 Id. at 214.
14 Id.
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the allegations that we received.15 We were able to identify most of
the accused that were prosecuted on the basis of photographs that
were taken at the time of their migration to Australia. These were
photographs taken in the late 1940's, and we were able to obtain
those photographs and show them to the witnesses so that we weren't
showing photographs of men in their seventies. We were able to
show relatively contemporary photographs. That's how we went
about proving the cases in Australia. We are adopting a similar
approach in relation to Yugoslavia.
Before I talk too much about Yugoslavia, I would like to add
to the debate that has already taken place tonight, that is, whether
there should be trials by an international tribunal or national courts. 6
What I would like to say about that is that the tribunal's jurisdiction
is concurrent to that of national courts.' 7 It is possible for national
courts to run and try cases with the tribunal's jurisdiction having
prominency over the national courts.' 8
The task facing the Yugoslav tribunal is somewhat different
and a little bit more complicated than that faced by the Australian
investigations and I dare say that did face the Nuremberg
prosecutors.' 9 That is because the conflict in the former Yugoslavia
is still ongoing.2
The warring parties have not left a paper trail in the same
15Id. at 211.
16 For a discussion of this issue, see generally Theodor Meron, International
Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554 (1995).
17 Statute of the International Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, annexed to Report
of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), U.N. S.C. Doc. S/25704, para. 49 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163, 1173
(1993), adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993) [hereinafter Yugoslavia
Statute] (detailing jurisdiction of national courts and international tribunals).
18 Id. (stating that "[t]he International Tribunal and national courts shall have
concurrentjurisidiction"); see Meron, supra note 16, at 576 (describing the jurisdictional
relationship between national courts and the international tribunals).
19 See Richard Caseby, U.N. Powerless on War Crimes, Times Newspapers Ltd.,
Feb. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, PAPERS File (quoting the chief
British Nuremberg prosecutor as saying that the task facing the Yugoslav tribunal "will
be much more difficult than Nuremberg").
20 See Goldstone, supra note 6, at 618.
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way that the Nazi Germans did,2 although there are some documents
which have been siezed, it remains to be seen just how relevant they
will prove to be.
However, we will have to prove the historical context within
which this conflict occurred and we intend to do that by calling
historians. Obviously, World War II Nazi historians are not relevant
to this particular case, but we have been able to find a number of
relevant historians. I suspect that primarily the evidence we will call
to establish the commission of crimes will be direct evidence and that
will come from witnesses.22 There are various forms of witnesses,
including the United Nations Protection Force and other U.N. and
non-governmental organizations which have been stationed in the area
and have observed the commission of crimes.23 We take the view
that such individuals are potential witnesses before the tribunal and
we expect to call them.
There have also been hundreds of thousands of refugees that
have fled the former Yugoslavia24 and in Germany alone there are
400,000 refugees.25 All of these people are potential witnesses, and
the tribunal is attempting to locate and identify those who can give
relevant evidence. We expect that when prosecutions commence, we
will be able to call eye witnesses before the tribunal.
21 See id. at 617 (commenting that "[a] paper trail, such as that which assisted the
prosecutors at Nuremberg, has not been discovered in respect of the former
Yugoslavia"); Alex Ross, Watching for a Judgment of Real Evil, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
1995, at H37, H40 (commenting that the prosecutors at Nuremberg relied extensively
on written records and that "it is doubtful that a similar paper trial [sic] exists in
Bosnia").
22 Tomuschat, supra note 11, at 243 (commenting that at the International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, the "main source of evidence will ...be testimony by
witnesses").
23 See generally Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Friedman Award Address, 33 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 251, 255 (1995).
24 Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Pressure on Serbia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
1992, at A39 (noting that more than 500,000 refugees have fled the former Yugoslavia);
see Frank Wright, Adrift in a Sea of Unknown; Bosnians Leave Lives Behind to Seek
Refuge on Croation Island, STAR TRIBUNE, Aug. 13, 1995, at IA (noting that over one
million refugees have fled the former Yugoslavia).
2 Roger Cohen, Lost in War; A Special Report; One Bosnian Family, Torn Apart
and Scattered, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1994, at Al, A5 (noting that there are 400,000
refugees in Germany).
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One of the main differences between the Nuremberg
prosecutions and those being undertaken by our tribunal is the fact
that the accused in the case of Nuremberg were in custody, while in
the case of the tribunal, they are not.26 And, in effect, the tribunal
has been set up to prosecute those who are most responsible for the
commission of the crimes z7 and, of course, many of them are still in
political and military power today.8 That just leads me to explain
how, in my view, the tribunal can be successful, notwithstanding the
fact that Yugoslavia in particular has indicated that it will not
surrender individuals to our jurisdiction.29
The rules of the tribunal provide as follows: That on the
completion of an investigation, once the prosecutor is satisfied that
there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case,3" an
indictment is prepared. and submitted to a trial judge.3' If the trial
judge is satisfied that the evidence does, in fact, establish a prima
facie case, the judge confirms the indictment and issues an arrest
warrant.32 That warrant is then forwarded to the country where the
26 See UN Votes To Set Up War-Crimes Tribunal, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb.
23, 1993, at IA (noting that in Yugoslavia, suspects were not indicted, "let alone
apprehended").
27 Goldstone, supra note 6, at 617 (explaining that due to the small number of trial
chambers, only those who were "the most guilty" should be indicted).
28 SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMES COMMITTED
IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 2 (1993) [hereinafter REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL]; see Kenneth S. Gallant, Securing the Presence of Defendants Before the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradition, 5 CRIM
L.F. 557, 557 (1995) (observing that many individuals who have committed war crimes
remain in command).
29 Bosnia Serb Leader Rejects Handover of Suspects, Reuters, Feb. 13, 1995,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File; cf. Howard S. Levie, The Statute
of the International Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia: A Comparison with the Past and
a Look at the Future, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1, 23 (1995) (observing that
former Yugoslavian territories cannot be expected to surrender personnel to the tribunal
for prosecution). -
I See Goldstone, supra note 6, at 617 (commenting that the evidence must at least
establish a prima facie case); Levie, supra note 29, at 20, 21 (describing the process by
which the prosecutor investigates alleged crimes, collects evidence and brings
indictments before a judge for review and approval).
3 Levie, supra note 29, at 21.
3 See generally id. at 22.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM RTS.
person who is the subject of the warrant is residing, together with the
request that that individual be surrendered to the tribunal.33 Because
the tribunal has been set. up under Chapter seven of the U.N.
Charter,34 there's an obligation on all member states to comply with
such a direction,35 so that in the case of a noncompliance, further
things can happen.36
If somebody is not surrendered pursuant to the first warrant,
the process is as follows: The prosecutor will represent the indictment
and will call the evidence upon which that indictment is based. That
evidence will be led in public, which means that it is there for the
world to see. Having led that evidence, the trial chamber can
reconfirm the indictment and can issue an international arrest warrant.
At the same time, it can inform the Security Council of the
noncooperation of the country which failed to surrender the individual
in the first place, and the Security Council can then impose sanctions
upon that noncooperating country." 7
Now I take the view that if the tribunal is in existence long
enough, and if it indicts the persons who are most responsible for
crimes, if they are political leaders, the mere fact of publication of
the evidence will brand internationally those individuals as fugitives.
The fact that there is an international arrest warrant in existence will
have the effect of confining that individual to the country where he
is." Now, I don't think it is being overly optimistic to think that
after some periods of years if these individuals remain as political
leaders, they will, in effect, become unable to govern because they
33 Id.
34 See REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, supra note 28, at v.3; Boutros-Ghali,
supra note 23, at 254.
31 See Levie, supra note 29, at 22 (stating that the duty of states to turn over persons
indicted is "mandatory").
36 See Boutros-Ghali, supra note 23, at 254.
31 See Stephen Engelberg, War Crimes Panel Orders Suspect Released, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 1995, at A10 (explaining that failure to cooperate with the tribunal could result
in sanctions).
31 See Marie Ryan, Prosecutor of a New Nuremberg, Tribunals at the Hague are
About To Tackle the Horrors of Bosnia and Rwanda, THE INDEPENDENT, June 7, 1995,
at 27 (noting that international arrest warrants will reduce the number of countries
offering criminals safe haven); see also Peter Benesh, UN Tribunal Set Up War-Crimes
Trial of Serbs, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1995, at Al (noting that the country where the
criminal is living becomes a kind of jail).
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will not be able to maintain the confidence of the electorate; 39 nor
will they be able to participate in international discussions.
If that's the case, it is not hard to imagine that their popularity
in their own country will wane and they may be opposed.4" I would
think that a political opponent coming to power would only be too
willing to surrender a political adversary to the tribunal. So if the
tribunal is in existence long enough, I think we will see those
individuals surrendered to the tribunal and they will be subject to its
jurisdiction. I would hope that if we're successful in that way, it will
be a "shot in the arm" for the creation and establishment of a
permanent international criminal court. I firmly believe that is what
is needed to set up a deterrent to stop future atrocities and future
genocide. 4'
To the extent that the tribunal needs your support, I ask for
it. I think it is going to be a long haul. We can't guarantee or
assume that we will receive support into the future. If it stands that
the tribunal is doing what it is set up to do, then I would ask for the
support of everybody here to speak up when the time comes that
people might be able to close the tribunal down. Thank you very
much.
3 Joyce Hackel, A Genocide Later, Rwanda Again on Edge, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 28, 1995, at 1 (noting that "confidence in the government is eroding"
as injustices continue).
4 Id.
4' See Ved P. Nanda, UN Cracks Down on War Criminals, DENVER POST, Nov. 13,
1994, at F4; see also Michael Clough, The UN Must Abandon its New Military Role,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1994, at M1 (observing that a permanent international criminal
court "would provide a significant deterrent against the kind of atrocities occurring in
Rwanda").
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PROFESSOR TEITEL: Ambassador Bakuramutsa.
Ambassador Manzi Bakuramutsa
AMBASSADOR BAKURAMUTSA: First I want to explain that I'm
not a lawyer and I'm discussing here a very big issue which is for the
lawyers. I also would like to explain that instead of being positive,
I'm going to be negative because the title of my speech is "Why the
Government of Rwanda Called for an International Tribunal and Yet
Opposed the United Nations Security Council Resolution" which
established the tribunal. 2 I hope you understand this position.
First, I would like to say that it is nearly one year ago to the
day, that on April 6, 1994, and continuing for a period of about two
months, the world witnessed the mass murder, thanks to CNN, of
hundreds of thousands of members of the Abatutsi, minority ethnic
group in Rwanda, as well as Hutus, who were members of opposition
political parties.43
This means that according to the October 1994 Harper's
index, half of the Abatutsi population in Rwanda has been killed since
May." That is compared to the killing of one-third of the German
Jewish population between 1933 and 1945. 4" The present estimate of
the number of Abatutsi killed in a two-month period was
approximately one million from among a population of seven and a
42 See generally Melissa Gordon, Justice on Trial: Efficacy of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 INT'L LAW STUDENT ASs'N J. INT'L & COMP. L. 217,
221-22 (1995); Rwanda Genocide Inquiry Begins at Last, DAILY TELEGRAPH, OCt. 10,
1994, at 10.
4" Gordon, supra note 42, at 219 (noting that "[i]n the first three months of 1994,
one million Tutsis were slaughtered"); Raymond Bonner, U.N. Commission Recommends
Rwanda 'Genocide' Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1994, at Al, A13; David Lamb,
The Road to Ruin for Rwanda; Today's Horrors Are Rooted in a Past of Ethnic Hatred
and Perils of an Army-Like Many of Africa-Trained Not to Defend the Borders but to
Preserve the Ruling Hierarchy, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 11, 1994, at Al ("several hundreds
of thousands killed and two million homeless").





Mothers and children were eviscerated.47 Rivers were filled
with blood and bodies and schools and churches were turned into
slaughter houses.4 The killings succeeded in disintegrating
Rwandese society and only stopped when the Army of the Rwandese
political front defeated the then-Rwandese Government Army.49
Since 1959, successive governments of Rwanda have consistently
committed human rights violations on a massive scale,5 ° to the extent
that in 1964 the Pope and Nobel Laureates Sir Bertrand Russell and
Jean Paul Sartre characterized the killing in Rwanda as the most
heinous genocide of this century after the one committed by the Nazis
against the Jews.5
Even as recently as the period of 1990 to 1993, massacres of
Abatutsi have taken place in Rwanda.52 The perpetrators of the series
of acts of genocide have never been brought to justice. The culture
of impunity lead to the tragedy of April and July 1994.
Undoubtedly, genocide had occurred in Rwanda.
Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948 states;
Genocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing
members of the group; causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions on life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
I See Gordon, supra note 42, at 219.
41 See Lamb supra note 43, at Al.
I Manoah Esipisu, Only Dogs Remain in Rwandan Massacre Village, Reuters, Sept.
30, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File.
49 See Lamb, supra note 43, at Al.
I See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Can a Majority Bring Itself to Justice for Crimes Against
a Minority, THE RECORDER, Jan. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, PAPERS
File (commenting that Rwanda has seen a "cycle of killing with impunity" since 1959).
11 See Lamb, supra note 43, at Al (noting "several hundred thousand killed and two
million homeless").
52 Bonner, supra note 43, at A 1, A 13; Andrew Jay Cohen, On the Trial of Genocide,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1994, at A23.
1995] 641
642 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM RTS. [Vol. XII
[among others]." 3
As concluded by the special rapporteur for human rights, the
conditions, as stated in the definition, were obvious in the case of
Rwanda in view of the massacres that were perpetrated and the
propaganda which incited the killings.5a
The government of Rwanda, which was established in July
1994, strongly believes that bringing the perpetrators of genocide to
justice is an indispensable part of the process of establishing the rule
of law, achieving national reconciliation and building a stable
democratic society. 5 To that end, it requested the Security Council
of the United Nations to establish an international tribunal to judge
those who committed the crimes.56
Addressing the U.N. General Assembly on October 6, 1994,
the President of Rwanda called for the creation of an international
tribunal as a matter of urgency." It was seen as a necessary tool for
justice, in view of the fact that most of the criminals had sought
refuge in other countries.58 In that statement, the President said,
"Rwanda requests the Security Council to adopt a resolution to
facilitate the arrest and trial of the murderers who were hiding in the
refugee camps outside the country. The resolution will grant
authority to hold persons who are suspected in the genocide. Six
53 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for the United States Feb. 23,
1989) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; see Matthew Lippman, The 1948 Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Forty-Five Years Later, 8
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 22 (1994) (citing definition of Genocide Convention).
See, e.g.,UN Panel Charges Genocide in Rwanda, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 4, 1994, at
6.
5 See Rwanda; President Says Killers Must Be Punished or Effects of Genocide Will
Spread Abroad, BBC Summary World Broadcasts, Oct. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, TXTNWS File.
- S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, 3453 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994) (taking note of Rwanda's request to establish an international tribunal).
51 Underlying Problems in Carribean Continue To Be 'Unnoticed and Unattended,'
Prime Minister ofAntigua and Barbados Tells General Assembly, Fed., News Serv., Oct.
7, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter Underlying
Problems Continue] (indicating that Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungo expressed to
the General Assembly the "urgency" of prosecuting through an international tribunal
those responsible for genocide).
5 Id.
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months after the crimes were committed, there must be action. "5 9
That appeal was also in a letter to the Security Council in July
1994. The special rapporteur appointed on recommendation of the
commission of human rights, Rene Degni-Sequi, recommended the
establishment of the tribunal in his report of October 13, 1994, on the
situation of human rights in Rwanda.' °
As a member of the Security Council for the two years 1994
and 1995, the present government of Rwanda participated in the
protracted consultation to draft the resolution to establish the
international tribunal. However, as a result of the strong political
interests of other governments, the end result was unsatisfactory to
Rwanda and the Rwandan representative chief, therefore, voted
against the resolution.6'
On November 8, 1994, the United Nations Security Council
adopted Resolution 955 and entitled it "Establishment of an
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandese Citizens Responsible for such
Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States." 62 The
vote of the fifteen members of the Council was as follows: thirteen
in favor, one against, which was Rwanda, and one abstention, which
was China.63
The reason why Rwanda proposed the establishment of the
tribunal is because the international tribunal was seen as the means
to eradicate the creature of impunity, which has characterized
Rwandese society since 1959.' The Rwandese, who had been taught
that it was acceptable to kill as long as the victim was from a
different ethnic group or from an opposition party, cannot arrive at
national reconciliation unless they learn new values. National
9 Id.
6 See, e.g.,Christina M. Cerna, A Small Step Forward for Human Rights: The
Creation of the Post of United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights, 10 AM.
U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1265, 1270 (1995).
61 See, e.g.,Raymond Bonner, Shattered Nation: A Special Report; Rwanda Now
Faces Painful Ordeal of Rebirth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29 1994, at Al.




I See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 50.
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reconciliation can be achieved only if accountable justice is
established and if the survivors of genocide are assured that what has
happened will never happen again.65
Secondly, by asking for the establishment of the international
tribunal, the Rwandese government wanted to involve the
international community, which was so harmed by the genocide and
by the grave and massive violation of international humanitarian law.
It wanted to enhance the exemplary nature of justice that would be
seen to be completely neutral and fair.66
Thirdly, the Rwandese government appealed for an
international presence in order to avoid any suspicion of its wanting
to organize pity, vengeful justice.67 Fourthly, the Rwandese
government requested and finally supported the establishment of the
tribunal to make it easier to get at those criminals who have found
refuge in foreign countries.68 Fifthly, the genocide committed in
Rwanda is a crime against humanity and it should be suppressed by
the international community as a whole.69
See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, 3453 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994) (recognizing that "prosecution of persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law would . . . contribute to the process of
national reconciliation"); see also id.
I Jason A. Dzubow, The International Response to the Civil War in Rwanda, 8 GEO.
IMMIG. L.J. 513, 519 (1994) (observing that the international character of the tribunal
will produce neutral judges rather than judgments made by the victims of the accused).
67 See Cease-Fire Agreement in Tajikistan,, Fed. News Serv., Nov. 9, 1994,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter Cease-Fire Agreement]
(acting as the representative of Rwanda, Manzi Bakuramutsa said his government had
appealed for the establishment of an international tribunal in order to avoid any suspicion
of a "speedy, vengeful justice").
I See Underlying Problems Continue, supra note 57; Rwanda Genocide Tribunal
Opens with Global Appeal,, June 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
TXTNWS File (stating that countries where planners of genocide sought refuge were
obliged under international law to cooperate with tribunal).
I See Lippman, supra note 53, at 70; Peter da Costa, Rwanda: U.S. and U.N.
Pressed to Dub Killings Genocide, Inter. Press Serv., May 3, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, WIRES Files (stating that the international community would be legally
required to take action for the suppression of acts of genocide); see also Ad Hoc
Committee on Establishment of International Criminal Court Weighs Questions of
Inherent Jurisdiction over Certain Matters, Aug. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, FEDNEW File (stating that genocide is among the crimes of international
concern to be suppressed by international court).
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Now, I will explain why the Rwandese government has
rejected the Security Council resolution. First, the government of
Rwanda regarded the dates set for the ratione temporis competence
of the international tribunal for Rwanda from January to the 31 st of
December 1994 as inadequate.7" The genocide which the world
witnessed in April 1994 had been the result of a long period of
planning during which pilot projects for extermination had been
successfully tested before this date. 7'
The international community, through its diplomatic
representatives and international organizations, as well as human
rights organizations, were well aware of the massacres that had taken
place in 1991, 1992, and 1993;72 it cannot claim that it became
cognizant of the situation only in the wake of the tragedy of April
1994. It had already been recognized by the special rapporteur of the
United Nations in May 1993 and in a March 1993 report of the
international commission that genocide had, in fact, occurred in
Rwanda.73 Consequently, the Rwandese government had to propose
that account be taken of the period from October 1, 1990, the
7 See Richard D. Lyons, U.N. Approves Tribunal on Rwandan Atrocities, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994 (noting that "the Rwandan delegate voted against the measure
[creating an international tribunal on Rwanda], complaining that it lacked a death penalty
and only covered crimes committed in 1994").
71 See Cease-Fire Agreement, supra note 67; Anthony Goodman, Council
Establishes Genocide Tribunal, Reuters World Serv., Nov. 8, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, REUWLD File; see also Rwanda; China Explains Security Council
Abstention on Rwanda Tribunal, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 16, 1994,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File (Rwanda ambassador found
inadequate the prosecution of only those suspected of committing genocide during 1994).
7 See generally Rebels Allege Massacre of Civilians in Rwanda, Agence France-
Presse, Aug. 13, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File (indicating
that more than 1000 Tutsi's were killed early in 1991); Rwanda Says Rebels Massacred
38 Civilians, Reuters, Jan. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD
File (reporting the deaths of Rwandan citizens at the hands of the Rwanda Patriotic
Front); Rwanda's Army Accuses Rebels of Massacres, Reuters Ltd., February 18, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File (reporting accusations that more
than 500 peasants were massacred).
11 See Delia Fahmy, Rwanda: Report Blames Government for Mass Slayings, Inter.
Press Serv., Mar. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File
(discussing the March report from the International Commission for the Investigation of
Human Rights Violations which criticized the Rwandan government for its role in
genocide).
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beginning of the war between the then-government of Rwanda and the
Rwandese patriotic front, to July 17, 1994, the defeat of the
government.7 4 That proposal was rejected by the members of the
Security Council without a valid reason.
An international tribunal which refused to consider the causes
of the genocide in Rwanda and its planning and that refused to
consider the pilot project that proceeded the major genocide of April
1994 cannot be of any use to Rwanda because it will not contribute
to eradicating the culture of impunity or creating a climate conducive
to national reconciliation.75 In this respect, there is a contradiction
between Article Six and Article Seven of the statute.7 6
Secondly, the government of Rwanda found that the
composition and the structure of the international tribunal for Rwanda
were inappropriate and ineffective.77 The tribunal is composed of
two-tier chambers with three judges in each.7" There the appeals
chamber is shared by the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and
tribunal for Rwanda, and it will have only five judges.7 9 The two
See Anthony Goodman, U.N. Establishes Rwanda Genocide Tribunal, Reuters
World Serv., Nov. 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File (stating
that the Kigali government alleges that the Hutu-led government began planning
genocidal massacres much earlier than July 1994).
" Cease-Fire Agreement, supra note 67 (observing that Rwanda was troubled that
certain countries which had taken an active part in the civil war would be able to
propose judges for the Tribunal and to make decisions regarding the imprisonment of
detainees).
76 Article 6 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda establishes a
prosecutorial plan designed to impose individual criminal responsibility. Statute of the
International Tribunalfor Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year,
3453 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). Article 7 limits the jurisdiction of the
tribunal to crimes committed during the period Jan. 1, 1994, to Dec. 31, 1994. Id.
17 See generally Cease-Fire Agreement, supra note 67 (discussing Rwanda's
objections to the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda).
11 See James C. O'Brien, The International Tribunal for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 645 (1993)
(describing the structure of the Tribunal as established by Articles 11 through 15 of the
Statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia).
" See Peter H.F. Bekker, Election of Judges of the International Tribunal for
Violations of Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 668, 668
(1993) (detailing the names of the eleven judges selected on September 17, 1993); see
also Julia Preston, Tribunal Set on Rwandan War Crimes; Kigali Votes No on UN
Resolution, WASH. POST., Nov. 9, 1994, at A44.
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tribunals will also share the same prosecutor.8" It is understood that
Rwanda will be supported by a deputy prosecutor. 8'
Given the magnitude of the task awaiting the staff of the
tribunal and the need for speedy and exemplary action by the
tribunal, the government of Rwanda asked that the number of trial
chamber judges be increased and that the international tribunal for
Rwanda be given its own appeal chamber and prosecutor.82 No well
founded reply was given. The Rwandese government considered that
the establishment of so ineffective an international tribunal would
only appease the conscience of the international government
community rather than respond to the expectations of the Rwandese
people and of the victims of genocide in particular.83
Thirdly, it was surprising, in light of the meager human and
financial resources available,8" that the draft statute for the
international tribunal intended to dispense its energy prosecuting
crimes that came under the jurisdiction of internal tribunals in
addition to the crime of genocide.85 Furthermore, nothing in the draft
resolution instructed and indicated the order of priority for crimes
considered by the tribunal. Under those conditions, nothing could
prevent the tribunal from devoting its resources on a priority basis to
prosecuting the crimes of plunder, corporal punishment, or the
intention to commit such crimes while relegating to a second river
I Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 15, annexed to S.C. Res.
955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, 3453 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (providing
that the prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia shall serve
as prosecutor before the International Tribunal for Rwanda); see Boutros-Gahli, supra
note 23, at 1614; Richard Norton Taylor, Rwanda Suspects Face Arrest, THE
GUARDIAN, Jan. 3, 1996, at 14 (observing that Judge Richard Goldstone is chief
prosecutor for both the Rwanda Tribunal and the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia).
81 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 15, annexed to S.C. Res.
955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, 3453 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (providing
for a Deputy Prosecutor to assist in actions before the International Tribunal for
Rwanda).
82 See Cease-Fire Agreement, supra note 67 (noting that the Rwandan government
objected to the number of judges as "inadequate" and requested its own prosecutor).
83 Goodman, supra note 74.
8 Roht-Arriaza, supra note 50 (commenting that the international criminal tribunal
on Rwanda "has been hampered by a lack of money and investigatory staff").
5 Cease-Fire Agreement, supra note 67.
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genocide that brought about its establishment.
8 6
Fourthly, certain countries took a very active part in the civil
war in Rwanda. My government hoped that everyone would
understand its concern at seeing those countries propose candidates
for judges and participate in the election.87
The fifth reason is that the government of Rwanda objected
to trial being held outside Rwanda since those who ordered the
massacres and are now living abroad would would get off more
lightly than ordinary Rwandans who faced the death penalty in local
courts.88 The fate of Rwandan detainees in foreign countries should
be the decision of the Rwandan people, or at least the international
tribunal.
The sixth reason is that the international tribunal, as designed
in the resolution, established a disparity in sentences and ruled out
capital punishment, which is, nevertheless, provided for in the
Rwandese penal code.89 Since it was foreseeable that the tribunal will
be dealing with the suspects who devised, planned, and organized the
genocide, they may escape capital punishment, whereas those who
simply carried out a plan would be subject to the harshness of that
sentence. That situation is not conducive to national reconciliation in
Rwanda. The seventh reason is that my government called for the
establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute those guilty of
genocide because the international community is deeply concerned in
I See Ad Hoc Committee on Establishment of International Criminal Court Weighs
Question of Inherent Jurisdiction over Certain Matters, Fed. News Serv., Aug. 18,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, FEDNEW File (noting that the international
court's jurisdiction covers not only crimes of genocide, but also war crimes, crimes
against humanity and aggression).
87 See Cease-Fire Agreement, supra note 67 (noting Rwanda's concern that some
countries which had played a role in the civil war would be permitted to propose tribunal
judges).
I See Rwanda Will Cooperate with Court, Kagame Says, Reuters, Nov. 9, 1994,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
89 See Raymond Bonner, Rwandan Leader, Calling U.S. Envoy 'A Disaster, 'Hopes
for a Replacement, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, PAPERS File (arguing that unequal justice will result from tribunal's lack of
power to impose death penalty); Raymond Bonner, Rwandans Divided on War-Crimes
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1994, at AlO (noting that defendants tried before the tribunal
will get lighter sentences than those tried before Rwandan courts).
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this respect.9°
Also and above all, we requested the establishment of this
tribunal to teach the Rwandese people a lesson, to fight against the
impunity to which it had become accustomed since 1959. 9' The other
main objective was to promote national reconciliation. It, therefore,
seemed clear that the seat of the international tribunal should be set
in Rwanda. It will have to deal with the Rwandese against the
Rwandese. Only in this way can the desired effect be achieved.
Furthermore, establishing the seat of the tribunal on
Rwandese soil would promote the harmonization of international and
national jurisprudence. The authors of the draft hesitated to indicate
where the future seat of the tribunal would be. The change proposed
by the Rwandese government could very well be accommodated by
international law and did not run counter to the idea of international
jurisdiction.
Although Rwanda wants and believes in having an
international tribunal for the country, and although the government
is convinced that such a tribunal could be organized, taking into
account the concern of the Rwandese people without bearing its
international nature and its independence, my government decided to
vote against the draft resolution. 92
Now, it would be unfair if I didn't share with you the position
of other countries who are members of the Security Council. The
government of Rwanda requested the establishment of an international
tribunal to try the perpetrators of genocide, and the establishment was
supported by the majority of the members of the Security Council.93
I would like to share with you the points of view of some
countries which have taken a position in these matters. In abstaining
in the vote of resolution, the permanent representative of China stated
that "it is an incautious act to vote in a hurry on a draft resolution
and statute that the Rwandan government still finds difficult to accept,
and it is also hard to tell what impact this may have on any relevant
9 France: A 'Duty' to Halt Rwanda's Killings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June
27, 1994, at 12.
91 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 50 (commenting that Rwanda has seen a "cycle of
killing with impunity" since 1959).
9 See generally Lyons, supra note 70.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
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effort in the future." 94 The Chinese representative supported the
Rwandese desire for full resolution on the draft. That position was
endorsed by the permanent representative of Brazil as well.
As we stated, in the case of the tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, Brazil is not convinced that the competence to establish
and/or exercise an international criminal jurisdiction is among the
constitutional powers of the Security Council,95 or that the option of
resorting to a resolution of the Security Council is the most
appropriate method for such a purpose. These are the two main
states which took a very strong position.
The government of Rwanda remains convinced that the
permanent interest of the international community in setting up the
tribunal was to appease its conscience96 in view of the fact that it had
not responded to save the Rwandese from genocide.97 It was a
delayed response of the international community which stood by and
allowed one million people to die. The establishment of the
international tribunal provided them with a sense of self-satisfaction
and achievement in response to the genocide.
In spite of its principal decision to vote against the resolution
to establish the international tribunal for Rwanda, the government of
Rwanda stated publicly that it has cooperated with the United Nations
on the matter.98 It will continue to do so if the United Nations or the
tribunal do not work against the interest of the people and the
government of Rwanda. The primary concern of the government is
and remains that the international tribunal be set up as an integral part
of the process of establishing the rule of law in achieving national
reconciliation in a country which has been torn apart by a state policy
I See Goodman, supra note 74 (quoting the Chinese Representative).
91 See Ralph Zacklin, War Crimes: Bosnia and Beyond, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 277, 279
(1994) (commenting that some have argued that establishing the war crimes tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia exceeds the Security Council's power under Chapter VII).
Goodman, supra note 74.
9 Louise Lief, The Prevent Defense, An Agreement with Cuba Cools Tensions, but
Other Crises Are Heating up, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 19, 1994, at 51.
98 Lyons, supra note 70, at A12 (noting that the Rwandan government has stated it
will cooperate with the tribunal and quoting Representative Bakuramutsa as saying




of extreme human rights violation.99
I would like to end my speech by telling you where we are
now. The Rwandan government was hoping that the international
tribunal would try all the people responsible for the deaths of over
one million people. Now it is busy establishing a national tribunal in
which the government has just passed a law to authorize international
judges and lawyers to come into Rwanda and to strengthen the
national tribunal in a way that will respond to the need of the
country. I thank you very much.
PROFESSOR TEITEL: Thank you very much, Ambassador, for the
statement and the important update. Now Lt. Col. Lepper.
I See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, 3453 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994) (observing that national reconciliation can be achieved by the
prosecution of those responsible for humanitarian law violations). See generally Eric
Randsell, The Wounds of War, A Reconstruction of Rwanda 's Genocide Suggests the
Killing Could Return, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 28, 1994, at 67 (describing the
genocide and mass killings that have taken place in Rwanda).
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Lt. Col. Steven Lepper
LT. COL. LEPPER: I thank the law school and the Journal of
Human Rights in particular for inviting me and all of us to attend this
very important symposium. I would also like to provide a standard
caveat. Since I am a U. S. Government lawyer, I don't want
anything I say to be construed as a U. S. Government position.
Everything that I say here are my own thoughts and that's likely to
become very obvious to you in just a moment.
My thesis, basically, is that although international tribunals
are very important and, indeed, in Bosnia and Rwanda extremely
appropriate, they are not the solutions to all of our problems.
Certainly, in some cases they can, in fact, get in the way of what we
are ultimately trying to achieve; to establish responsible state practice
in the world.
Ultimately, the prevention of violations of international
humanitarian law is a function of vigorous state adherence to
international law. This adherence, I contend, comes in two basic
forms. First, states must resolve to use force," °° if such force is
necessary and appropriate, and in a manner consistent with provisions
and principles of international humanitarian law. In other words,
they must strictly follow the rules set forth in the laws of war.
Second, if those rules are violated, they must be willing and able to
prosecute persons who violate them.
One of these principles, at least as they apply to the
prevention of jus in bello violations is the idea that only a highly
disciplined military force is capable of using force without violating
international humanitarian law. Now many of you may be one step
ahead of me and thinking that the Nazis were highly disciplined
military forces and they committed numerous law-of-war violations.o
Let me add to what I said, though, that this discipline must be
oriented properly. In other words, it is the disciplined military force
representing a government and people dedicated to the rule of law
o See, e.g.,Bruce W. Nelan, Crimes Without Punishment, TIME, Jan. 11, 1993, at
21.
101 See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS:
A PERSONAL MEMOIR 200-07, 584 (1992)(note book review inthe issue).
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that is capable of following the laws of war. The one example I'm
most familiar with, being a member of it, is the U.S. Armed Forces.
The United States, like many states today, is dedicated to the
endorsement of and the adherence to international humanitarian law.
We in the military take that responsibility very seriously. We train
and retrain our people periodically so that they understand what their
rights and obligations are.
Our Uniform Code of Military Justice, or U.C.M.J., provides
for the prosecution of military members who violate that law.'02 The
U.C.M.J. also gives commanders the ultimate responsibility to
prosecute war crimes committed by their troops.'°3 It is a necessary
attribute of their authority and essential to their ability to control the
actions of their units. Anything that undermines that ability to
prosecute, or authority to discipline their troops ultimately weakens
the discipline of the force and, therefore, increases the likelihood of
law- of- war violations.
Now, one possible threat to the authority of commanders and
the discipline of the military commanders is an over-reliance on
international prosecutions. Certainly, as Bosnia and Rwanda
illustrate, international tribunals are appropriate in some
circumstances. However, employing them in all conflicts may have
the unintended effect of undermining state responsibility for
adherence to and prosecution of violations of international
humanitarian law."04 I contend that this threat exists at two levels.
First, at the state level, international tribunals may provide
reluctant national leaders an easy way to avoid their responsibility to
prosecute or extradite persons who commit international humanitarian
law violations.105 An example is the terrorist bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103.106 While international prosecution of terrorists would be
102 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-835 (1990) (Uniform Code of Military Justice).
103 See id. at §§ 816-821.
14 See Stuart H. Deming, War Crimes and International Criminal Law, 28 AKRON
L. REV. 421, 423 (1995) (observing that overemphasis on international criminal court
could "provide an easy way out" for countries which are not developing effective
prosecutorial systems themselves).
, Id.
'6 See generally Craig R. Whitmey, Jetliner Carrying 258 to U.S. Crashes in
Scottish Town, N.Y.TIMEs, Dec. 22, 1988, at Al (noting that Flight 103 from Frankfurt
to New York crashed over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 258 aboard).
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far better than a sham prosecution in Libya, neither is a solution to
the essential problems of Libya's refusal to reject terrorism.1 7
The U.N. sanctions renewed last week are appropriate efforts
to get Libya to become a responsible member of the international
community. But to allow Libya to submit terrorists to an
international tribunal, without also requiring it to accept responsibility
for its support of international terrorism, will result in short-term
justice for these particular terrorists. However, it will also turn down
the heat on Libya' and, therefore, come at the expense of allowing
it to abdicate its long-term responsibility to conform its behavior to
international norms. 109
At a second level, a knee-jerk establishment of international
tribunals may undermine the authority of military commanders. To
the extent that international tribunals prevent commanders from
exercising disciplinary authority over their own troops, they remove
what is perhaps the key to state adherence to international laws of
war. Again, the short term benefits of imposing international justice
will come at the long-term expense of command authority, disciplined
forces and, therefore, state adherence to international humanitarian
law.
Now, all of this begs a fundamental question: Under what
circumstances should international prosecutions be pursued? The
fundamental answer, I suggest, is when national prosecutions, in
either the offender's state of nationality or in any other state with
legitimate jurisdiction over and ability to prosecute the offense, would
not satisfy the ends of justice."' Three specific examples can be
derived from the Nuremberg, Bosnia, and Rwanda tribunals.
First, when the state itself is responsible for the crimes, it
,o Richard Z. Chesnoff, He Just Keeps on Ticking, Economic Sanctions Have Not
Quenched Muammar Qadhafi's Fire, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 21, 1994, at 55
(observing that the U.N. imposed stiff sanctions upon Libya which refused to extradite
two Libyan nationals charged with bombing Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988).
1 0 See generally Paul Lewis, Libya Unyielding Despite UN Demand, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 1992, at A8.
"09 See generally Deming, supra note 104, at 423.
110 Meron, supra note 16, at 576.
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may not be appropriate to allow it to prosecute the offenders."' The
best example here is Nazi Germany. Had Germany emerged from
the war intact, as, for example, Iraq emerged from Desert Storm," 2
it would hardly have been appropriate for its leaders to sit in
judgment of themselves. " 3 Now, the reason I hedged a bit by saying
it may not be appropriate for a state responsible for crimes to
prosecute its own offenders is because a change in regime may lead
to circumstances favoring domestic prosecution of former leaders. " I
4
A perfect contemporary example of that is Ethiopia. The genocide
in Ethiopia is only now being revealed," 5 and it's to Ethiopia's credit
and also to Rwanda's credit that both countries are willing to invite
the world to watch their two countries prosecute persons who are
accused of committing war crimes." 6
The second situation in which international prosecution will
be preferred to domestic prosecution is where the state with
jurisdiction is either unwilling or unable to prosecute or extradite the
offender,' or when an attempted domestic prosecution is obviously
a sham." 8 As I mentioned a moment ago in the Libya situation, in
these cases it would be far better to compel the state to live up to its
international obligations by getting it to conduct its own prosecutions.
.. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts. The 'Duty' to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2565 (1991) (noting that
states that have committed war crimes are usually incapable of prosecuting offenders
because of the political repercussions that may ensue within the country).
12 See, e.g., Monroe Karmin, National Press Club Luncheon, Fed. News Serv.,
Oct. 11, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, FEDNEW File.
13 See Orentlicher, supra note 111, at 2565.
"4 See Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention, 8 HARV. HUM.
RTs. J. 229, 232 (1995) (observing that an exception to the rule that states involved in
genocide should not try themselves exists where "a new political elite seizes power
through a coup d'etat").
"5 See Ethiopian Ex-Rulers Go on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1994, at A8
(describing the first day of the trials of former Ethiopian leaders on crimes of gencocide
and crimes against humanity).
16 Edward O'Loughlin, Africa Dominated by War and Peace, THE IRISH TIMES,
Dec. 29, 1994, at 4.
"I See Akhavan, supra note 114, at 232 (noting that "[i]n general, most states'
prosecutorial and judicial apparatus are unwilling, or unable, to confront powerful elites
who may be responsible for genocidal acts").
"8 See Orentlicher, supra note 111, at 2564 n.106.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM RTS.
Finally, international prosecutions are useful methods of
breaking circles of violence. As in both Bosnia and Rwanda, where
ethnic genocide has been engaged in for quite some time," 9 the effort
toward establishing an international tribunal which will both be fair
and be perceived as fair will be a way to prevent either side from
considering the prosecutions to be victor's justice. Now, during the
next two weeks here in New York at the U.N., the General Assembly
is considering creation of an International Criminal Court.
The current draft statute finalized by the International Law
Commission last summer does not adequately distinguish between
those cases for which international war crimes prosecutions are
appropriate or not appropriate. Although its preamble appropriately
states that the International Criminal Court is intended to be
complimentary to national criminal justice systems, 2° several of its
operative provisions belie that assertion. It is the objective of an
overwhelming majority of the states participating in these negotiations
to ensure that international prosecutions called for and established
under the International Criminal Court do not undermine the efficacy
of the extensive national criminal justice and extradition systems that
we have put into place over the last fifty years.
During the current Ad Hoc Committee negotiations, we have
the opportunity to reign in the impulses plunging us headlong into a
system of international criminal justice that might provide short term
benefits at the expense of long term problems. Our challenge is to
establish a balance between the need for international prosecutions in
some cases and state prosecutions in others. I hope you wish us luck
in that endeavor. Thank you.
PROFESSOR TEITEL: Thank you, Lt. Lepper and now Mr.
O'Brien. I'm sure there will be responses to some of these
statements in the comments to come.
"l See O'Loughlin, supra note 116, at 4.
120 See James Crawford, The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal
Court, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 404, 409 (1995) (pointing out that the preamble to the draft




MR. JIM O'BRIEN: I also have to note that my comments are my
own, not necessarily those of the U.S. Government. When you work
on these issues every day, it is very easy to forget how far we have
come in the last few years. I find my work to be an exercise in
remembering.
What I want to do today is to talk about the political will to
support these tribunals, some of the significant issues facing the
tribunals and what I think the legacies of these tribunals might be.
Along the way I would like to drop a few facts just so people
understand much of the efforts the international community has put
into these tribunals to this point.
The first, political will: How do you generate the will to
create and then to sustain efforts like these? The political will arose
I think from a simple, almost cynical, explanation. In Yugoslavia in
1992 we saw a Holocaust again, for the first time in my lifetime, and
I think people realized we had to respond in some way. 12 1 One
response, not a complete response but one response, was to create an
international tribunal that would hold the people responsible for the
atrocities individually accountable. 22 This is the response we saw
after World War II. The Security Council could not turn away when
faced with a similar violence on a grander scale, as the Ambassador
noted, in Rwanda a year and a half later. In November 1994, the
Security Council established a tribunal for Rwanda.'23
Now, there is some political will to establish these tribunals.
The Yugoslav tribunal this week will finally receive its full budget of
close to $40 million over two years. 24 In addition to the U.N.
121 See Richard Norton Taylor, The Ghosts of Nuremberg, THE GUARDIAN
(remarking that the conduct in the former Yugoslavia resembled a holocaust and that
guilt, in part, inspired the creation of a tribunal to try war crimes).
122 Julian Bedford, Judges To Set Rules for Rwanda Genocide Tribunal, Reuters,
June 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File.
123 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, 3453 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994) (establishing the international tribunal for Rwanda); see Rwanda-Genocide Trial
Site, Prosecutor Named, Facts On File, Mar. 30, 1995, available in WESTLAW,
ALLNEWSPLUS database, FFWND File, 1995 WL 7732184.
124 See Thomas S. Warwick, War Crimes; Don't Let Them Get Away with It, WASH.
POST, Dec. 20, 1994 (characterizing the size of the U.N. budget as nearly $32 million).
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budget, of which the United States will pay at least a quarter,' 25 there
will be voluntary contributions. I think fifteen to twenty states have
contributed about $8 million; Pakistan and Malaysia, $3 million
between them. 126 The United States has contributed $3 million, 27 in
addition to the money we will owe as a result of the U.N. budget.
12
States are also contributing personnel. I think about ten to
fifteen states have contributed personnel to the Yugoslavia tribunal at
their own expense. The United States is paying for people to work
full-time on tribunal business, including a number of very
experienced prosecutors and investigators.1
29
In Rwanda, countries are beginning to make voluntary
contributions of funds. Switzerland, I think, made the first. 3° The
United Kingdom, Ireland, and the United States are also contributors.
We committed $1.4 billion thus far to the establishment of the
Rwandan tribunal. But those just get you the institutions and they
don't necessarily get you the results you want with those institutions,
and I'll talk some more about the problems the institutions will face.
But I think at one point it is all our responsibility to continue working
to make sure that the institutions maintain what momentum they've
got or to get more momentum if we need to have it. The
Yugoslavian tribunal took far too long to get running. If it weren't
for the efforts of Mr. Blewitt, it would have taken longer.
'2 See Stephen Seplow, U.N. Feels Helpless To Fulfill its Peacekeeping Mission;
Lacks Power to Enforce Security Council's Mandates, THE PHOENIX GAZETTE, Aug. 19,
1994, at A26 (noting that the United States pays about 25% of the U.N.'s regular
budget).
126 Cf. Stephanie Grant, Hague Court Tackles Both Yugoslavia and Rwandan Crimes,
Inter. Press Serv., April 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File
(characterizing Malaysia, Pakistan, and Italy as "substantial" cash donors).
... See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, ADVANCING AMERICAN INTERESTS
THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, Vol. 6, No. 8, Feb. 20,
1995.
2I See generally Seplow, supra note 125, at A26 (discussing United States
contributions to U.N.'s budget).
129 See Lt. Col. Steven Lepper, War Crimes and the Protection of Peacekeeping
Forces, 28 AKRON L. REV. 411, 413 (1995) (discussing the United States personnel
commitment to the tribunal).
13 See Stephanie Nebehay, Donors Pledge up to $600 Million in Aid to Rwanda,
Reuters, Jan. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File (indicating
that Switzerland has contributed aid to Rwanda).
658 [Vol. XlI
1995] PANEL III 659
He came on board nearly a year after the tribunal was
established and did a great deal of work to get it in shape."' The
chief prosecutor finally started work almost a year-and-a-half after the
tribunal was established, and it now has indictments and is preparing
for trials.'32 We would have liked to have seen all of that sooner.
But we hope that it is at least the beginning of an answer to many of
the atrocities suffered in the region in 1992 and 1993.
This week, the deputy Prosecutor is in Kigali, Rwanda. The
head of investigations has been there often and is preparing a plan.
A few United States-sponsored investigative teams have visited
Kigali, collected a number of important documents and also
conducted a number of interviews, so the tribunal is ready to start.
It is again too slow. We would have liked to have seen it operating
more quickly. Now, the Ambassador has outlined a number of
difficulties that the government of Rwanda had with the statute of the
tribunal, 133 and rather than engage in a point by point discussion of
those, I think what I note is the overall approach the U.S.
Government is taking to making the tribunal effective.
The statute is a compromise, 3 4 as any political document is.
But the idea is that the domestic jurisdiction of Rwandan courts will
work and will cooperate actively with the international jurisdiction
provided by the tribunal. This has a few advantages. The first is it
ensures that no one slips between the cracks; that neither side is
overwhelmed by its burden and thus unable to live up to its
obligations.
The second is, and I think this is particularly important for the
future of Rwanda, it commits the international community to making
the Rwandan justice system function effectively. Now, that's a
commitment I don't think we have lived up to. The United States has
'31 See generally Doyle, supra note 2, at 9 (profiling Graham Blewitt as deputy
prosecutor for the tribunals).
132 See ADDS Tribunal Fears Over Non-Extradition, Agence France-Presse, Feb. 13,
1995, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS database, AGFRP File, 1995 WL
7758751.
"I See Expert Commission Reiterates Genocide Findings, Associated Press, Dec. 2,
1994, available in WESTLAW, ASSOCPR database, 1994 WL 10110588.
134 See generally Peter Burns, An International Criminal Tribunal: The Difficult
Union of Principle and Politics, 5 CRIM. L.F. 341 (1994); David P. Forsythe, Politics
and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM L.F. 401 (1994).
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made commitments to improve the administration of justice in
Rwanda'35 and, although we have been slow getting money on the
ground, I think that's starting to happen now.
The European Union has committed about 150 people to be
there providing advice, in helping the Rwandan domestic judicial
system begin to work through the massive backlog of cases that is
present. 36 But I think a premise for that sort of cooperation is that
there has to be substantial overlap in their jurisdiction. There has to
be overlap in their ability to try all of the important people and all of
the important cases. You couldn't draw a black line from the
beginning and have them function effectively. What you need is to
have two bodies working towards the same end and then allow
qualified experts, independent of governmental pressure, to make the
decisions about which cases fit best in which body.
For all the differences that the Ambassador outlined, I would
like to emphasize that there's excellent cooperation from the Rwandan
government,' 37 and it makes clear throughout the debates that
although it might find some things in the statute difficult to accept,
138
it will cooperate with the tribunal. I think it has done everything that
is within its power to do, and we expect to have fruitful cooperation
from Rwanda in the future.
139
Now, I would like to turn briefly to a couple of substantive
issues and perhaps to the legacies of the tribunals. I just want to
mention two substantive issues facing the tribunal. The first one is
the scope of its jurisdiction.' 40 At Nuremberg, there were essentially
135 Madeleine K. Albright, International Law Approaches the Twenty-First Century:
A U.S. Perspective on Enforcement, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1595, 1603-04 (1995)
(observing that the United States has led efforts to establish, assist, and finance the
international tribunal for Rwanda).
136 Dzubow, supra note 66, at 519.
137 See Lyons, supra note 70, at A12.
138 Id.
139 Id.
14 See generally Levie, supra note 29, at 6, 7 (describing offenses over which the
tribunals have jurisdiction and noting that neither has jurisdiction over "crimes against
peace").
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three crimes: 14 1  (1) The crime against peace,142  the
crime of committing aggressive war, (2) crimes against humanity,
143
government-sponsored systematic campaign against certain protected
groups, which is a precursor to genocide, and (3) war crimes, 44
violations of the laws of war, essentially crimes against
noncombatants, prisoners of war, and civilians. Only the last two are
featured in the jurisdiction of the international tribunals in
Yugoslavia 45 and Rwanda. 46  I want to focus on crimes against
humanity.
I think the point we need to remember now, and I started by
141 See generally Brenton L. Saunders, The World's Forgotten Lesson: The
Punishment of War Criminals in the Former Yugoslavia, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
357, 363-66 (1994) (discussing the types of crimes with which the Nuremberg Tribunal
was concerned).
142 At Nuremberg, "crimes against peace" were defined as "planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan of conspiracy for the
accomplishment of the foregoing." Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug.
8, 1945, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 284.
143 The Nuremberg Tribunal defined "crimes against humanity" as "murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any
civilian population, before or during the war; or prosecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal ...... Id. at art. 6(c).
14 The Nuremberg Charter defined "war crimes" as:
[V]iolations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall
include, but not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to
slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in
occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or
persons on the seas, killing hostages, plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity.
Id. at art. 6(b).
"'s Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 17, at art. 3, 5, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1172,
1173-74 (defining the tribunal's jurisidiction with respect to violations of the customary
laws of war and crimes against humanity); see Ruth Wedgwood, War Crimes in the
Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the International War Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA. J.
INT'L L. 267, 271, 272 (1994) (indicating that violations of the customary laws of war
and crimes against humanity are among the actionable crimes under the Statute for the
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia).
11 Statute of the International Tribunalfor Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Year, 3453 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (listing and defining
the crimes over which the tribunal has jurisdiction).
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noting the importance of memory, is that the Nuremberg tribunal was
unable to try the Holocaust as such, and the reason for that was a
technical legal problem in its jurisdiction.147 The only way you could
prosecute the German government for its crimes against German
citizens, or the Czech government for crimes against its citizens and
all throughout the occupied areas, the statute required that the crimes
against humanity be committed in execution of or in connection to an
armed conflict. 4 ' The international tribunal essentially ruled out all
of the atrocities committed before World War II and then lumped the
remaining atrocities, those committed during World War II, into the
whole range of other atrocities committed during the result of the
Nazi regime during the War. I think we owe the victims in Bosnia
and in Rwanda a full account of the campaigns against them, of not
just the atrocities, but of the orchestration of those atrocities, by
putting that essentially on trial, 49 and this presents us with questions
of legal interpretation, a quintessential lawyers' problem.
The Yugoslavia statute provides jurisdiction over crimes
against humanity committed in armed conflict. 50 The question is,
what does that mean? The United States has argued that this means
simply crimes committed during an armed conflict, and because the
armed conflict continues and has occurred virtually the entire time,
this interpretation removes any requirement for substantive connection
between crimes against humanity and the armed conflicts. This
greatly reduces the burden on prosecutors and will allow the
prosecutors to directly place on trial the plans and campaigns
orchestrated by those who wanted to see ethnic cleansing carried out
through the death of innocent civilians.
The second substantive issue I wanted to discuss concerns
'4' See Wedgwood, supra note 145, at 271 (explaining that at Nuremberg, the
prosecution could only prosecute crimes against humanity which were committed "in
execution of or in connection with crimes against peace and conventional war crimes")
(internal quotation marks deleted)).
4 Id. at 271-72.
"I See id. at 271 (observing that the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
"would be well advised" to discard the jurisdictional limits which affected the
Nuremberg prosecutions).
15o Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 17, at art. 5, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1173-74
(stating the tribunal's jurisdiction over "crimes [against humanity] when committed in
armed conflict").
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defendants. How do you get them? As Mr. Blewitt indicated, we
don't have all of the defendants. 5' There cannot be in absentia trials
because those smack of show trials.' Often I think states want to
see an in absentia trial because you can put on evidence that wouldn't
survive a proper adversarial proceeding.' 53 We want to see a
thorough record established in this case.
What do we do if we cannot get defendants in custody? One
thing Mr. Blewitt has already outlinedT,-we can have what has been
called a super-indictment proceeding where the prosecutor appears
before the tribunal and presents all of the evidence he wishes to
present at trial.' 54 That establishes a record.'55 That's an important
point, I think, for the victims of the atrocities to know that somebody
has not forgotten them, but I think we want more. We want to put
people in the dock and try them.
How do you do that? There are ways. The first way is to
press states to cooperate. States have an obligation binding under
international law to turn over defendants. 5 6  Secretary of State
Christopher, Ambassador Albright and recently President Clinton,
have all said that the United States will hold states to their obligations
under the U.N. Charter.' 57 Ambassador Albright and Secretary
"I' See Akhavan, supra note 114, at 243 (indicating that many leading suspects
remain at large).
152 See Aryeh Neier, Judgment in Sarejevo?; For the Serbs' Victims, A War Crimes
Tribunal is the Last Hope, WASH. POST, April 18, 1993, at C3 (commenting that holding
a trial in the absence of a defendant would "lack the appearance of fairness"); see also
Wedgwood, supra note 145, at 267-68 (commenting that U.N. Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali recommended, and the Security Council agreed, not to permit in absentia
trials).
53 Id. at 268.
11 Id.; see also Gallant, supra note 28, at 581-83 (discussing the procedure which
permits the prosecutor to present all of the evidence against an accused to a judge before
gaining custody of the defendant).
, See Gallant, supra note 28, at 581-83.
's Levie, supra note 29, at 22-23 (discussing the obligation of states to cooperate
with the tribunal).
5' Cf. Lepper, supra note 129, at 412-14 (1995) (discussing the United States
commitment to and involvement in the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia). Member states have an obligation under the U.N. Charter to cooperate
with the Security Council of the United Nations. See Wedgwood, supra note 145, at
269.
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Christopher have both said that the U.S. will consider sanctions
against states that refuse to cooperate,' and that we will consider
cooperation with the tribunal in any decision to lift the crippling
economic sanctions now pointed against some states of the former
Yugoslavia.
A second way to capture defendants is when they travel.
Traditionally, Yugoslavs have been a very mobile work force in
Europe and it is a great tradition of these people to go and live with
family members or work abroad. The more that the tribunal is able
to focus on these folks and find them where they are living, the more
of them will be arrested. I think you will see more of that in the
future. The way that you track fugitives is first you have to get an
indictment. The international legal machinery is triggered by a
formal requirement, and we've only begun to utilize that formal
requirement in the last few months, and I think we will see more
arrests. 159
The third way is I think you just cannot forget, and I think
there are two elements to this. The first element is you have to
remember the Nazi hunters. The arrest of one person indicted by the
tribunal came about because a refugee saw someone she thought was
a perpetrator and badgered authorities until he was brought into
custody. I think that similar efforts by other refugees and a devotion
of resources by the prosecution to cultivating that kind of intensity of
effort will lead to more arrests. We might not get the leaders that
way but we will get a fair number of people.
The second element is that we can't let these states off the
hook. As Mr. Blewitt said, there will be political changes, and new
regimes may no longer be interested in protecting the people
protected by the current regime. 6' I think we have already seen a
sea of change in Serbian political rhetoric over the last year. As far
as my amateur historical research has revealed, for the first time,
158 See Jeri Laber & Ivana Nizich, The War Crimes Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia: Problems and Prospects, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7, 13 (1994)
(quoting Ambassador Albright as saying that sanctions will be imposed against those who
refuse to comply with the tribunal).
159 Akhavan, supra note 114, at 243-44.
1W Cf. id., at 244-45 (suggesting that blacklisting political figures may serve to
advance the democratization process by stigmatizing suspected criminals).
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Serbs are criticizing other Serbs for atrocities committed against other
ethnic groups.' 6' That could only have come about as a result of
international pressure upon them. It may at this point be political
opportunism, an attempt to appease the West. But it creates, I think,
a wedge in the different groups in the former Yugoslavia in a way in
which eventually the leaders of those states may see it to their
advantage to cooperate with the tribunal rather than to try to hide
fugitives from justice.'62
Now I just want to mention briefly what I see as the legacy
of the tribunals. The first, I think, is a political legacy, and that is
the tribunals provide a new tool for peace keeping.' 63 I don't think
we need go as far as Steve Lepper's fears," that is, to establish a
tribunal with mandatory jurisdiction over any conflict, but I think we
have to remember here the role of Nuremberg. 1
65
Professor Herbert Wechsler said a few years ago that he
thinks one of the reasons there was relatively little conflict after the
war ended in the cold winter of 1945 was that people knew that
process was being undertaken against the people who were
161 See, e.g., Serbs Report Atrocities by Own Militia, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 12,
1993, at A21 (observing that "for the first time since war broke out in the former
Yugoslavia . . . [local newspapers] published eyewitness accounts of atrocities Serb
paramilitary groups committed in Croatia and Bosnia").
162 Cf. Neier, supra note 152, at C3 (commenting on the resentment among Serbs
toward those responsible for war crimes and suggesting that the international tribunal
may provide a solution).
63 See generally S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (establishing the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia as a response to threats to peace and security); S.C. Res, 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th Year, 3453 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (establishing the International
Tribunal for Rwanda as a response to threats to peace and security); Alan C. Laifer,
Never Again? The "Concentration Camps" In Bosnia-Herzegovia: A Legal Analysis of
Human Rights Abuses, 2 NEw EUR. L. REV. 159, 179 (1994) (stating that the Security
Council recognized that war crimes "still constitute] an international threat to peace and
security").
'6 See supra text accompanying notes 100-20.
1 See Laifer, supra note 163, at 179 ("Madeleine Albright, the United States
Ambassador to the United Nations, stated with regard to this resolution that '[t]he
Nuremberg principles have been reaffirmed ... [but unlike the trials at Nuremberg] this
will be no victors' tribunal."').
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responsible for the conflict. 166  I think that we will see that the
tribunals will advance peace in the long term in both the former
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. 1
67
First, and most practically, the tribunals can remove people
who would otherwise cause violence.' 68 There are individuals
notorious as suspected war criminals who had become the targets of
reprisals, or who had engendered hatred amongst their followers. To
the extent they could be removed from the situation, from the camps
in Tanzania and other countries, or from the governmental structures
of the former Yugoslavia, we would have done peace, I think, a good
service. Secondly, the tribunals can promote an ideal of what these
societies should stand for, an account of individual accountability of
the rule of law.' 69
Now, for all the difficulties the Ambassador outlined, I think
the tribunal will make a contribution in both of these societies. I
think, when we are doing this, we have to remember the role of
memory as well, in both the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. Both
of these places are haunted by violent pasts. 170 In a way, ghosts are
causing violence. I know more about the former Yugoslavia and I
know a number of people there attribute the violence to the group
activities of other groups in the past. One thing the tribunal can do
is identify individuals and hold them responsible, so that people can
trace where the group enmity arose from and how it played out in
11 See Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles" in the Law:
Selections from the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 854, 911
(1993) (commenting that condemnation of reprehensible conduct through prosecutions
may have had a positive effect on the minds of victims).
167 See Laifer, supra note 163, at 179-80 (commenting that it is believed that
prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity will prevent future crimes and
will ultimately lead to "a furtherance of cooperation among peoples and the promotion
of international peace and security").
161 Id. See generally Bring the Killers to Justice, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
April 2, 1995, at 2 (commenting on the goal of the tribunals which is to eliminate war
crimes through prosecution of the guilty).
169 See Levie, supra note 29, at 4 (recognizing that "crimes against international law
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced").
170 See David M. Kresock, "Ethnic Cleansing"in the Balkans: The Legal Foundation
of Foreign Intervention, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203, 216-19 (1994) (discussing
Yugoslavia's violent past).
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this case. 171
The second legacy the tribunals may leave us is a legal legacy
concerning the relationship of a government to its own people. I've
already talked about crimes against humanity. That's the leg of both
the tribunals' jurisdiction that extends to a government's relationship
with its own people.172  Until a couple of years ago, that could be
applied only in a time of an armed conflict, perhaps even just an
international armed conflict.' 73 We are now seeing a weakening of
that connection, and it may be that, after these two tribunals, we will
have an opportunity to press ahead and prosecute government
officials for what they do to their own citizens in a time of peace.
174
Now when will that be? I don't know, and I don't know that
Steve Lepper and I, or other government officials, will be the ones
to make that decision. I think that decision will have to emanate
from a lot of concerned activities by citizens, by non-governmental
organizations, and by others. Again, it is something that all of us
have to do. It is not enough simply to come to a conference and talk
about this. We have to remain active in calling to the attention of
government the need to act in this area.
When I look back and try to remember what I think is most
important for guiding us here, I think we have to try to make sure
that the perpetrators are remembered, as a measure of humanity's
own depravity, and to make sure that we don't forget that. We have
to make sure that the victims are remembered as a measure of our
own resilience against evil and so they are not forgotten. As for
" See generally id. (discussing violence in Yugoslavia's past and how intense ethnic
hatred divides the country); Alex N. Dragnich, Bosnia-Herzegovia: A Case Study of
Anarchy in the Third World, 3 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 163, 163-65 (1995)
(discussing underlying causes of Yugoslavia's current bloodshed and the history of
violence and ethnic hatred in the country).
172 See Levie, supra note 29, at 11 (noting that some have argued that "only
international entities . . . are the subjects of international law and that, therefore,
individuals cannot be punished for violations of that law except as their national laws
may so provide and their national courts may so decide"). See generally Saunders,
supra note 130, at 360 (discussing the tribunal's ability to punish those who commit
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity).
173 See Levie, supra note 29, at 11; Saunders, supra note 141, at 360.
1'4 See generally Saunders, supra note 141, at 371 (discussing the fact that the
Security Council now has the "power to determine the existence of any threat to peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression").
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myself, as a government official, I want to make sure that I can
remember the role of government officials during World War II,
those who turned their backs on evidence of the Holocaust, and try
to see that I was not responsible in the same way, at least within my
own limited area.' So all of those arms of memory, I think, are
part of how we can proceed in this case and try to bring a little bit of
justice in two areas that have had too little.
PROFESSOR TEITEL: Thank you for those inspiring remarks. And
now Stephanie Grant who was director of program and policy of
human rights and was formally consultant to the United States special
rapporteur in Yugoslavia until 1984 in Geneva.
"I See TAYLOR, supra note 101, at 23 (quoting a German officer saying how




MS. STEPHANIE GRANT: I would like to say something along the
general theme of expectation and reality because I think one of the
difficulties we have in thinking about the Yugoslav tribunal is in
remembering that it is a relatively small and rather finite institution,
dealing with an enormously complex set of human and historical and
legal realities. 176
I am going to begin on a very specific note and that's just to
remind us that on the 13th of February, which is just six weeks ago,
the tribunal issued the first ever indictment on a charge of genocide.
The person indicted is named Zeljko Meakic.17 He was one of the
Bosnian Serbs charged with killing, beating, raping, and mistreating
prisoners at the Omarska death camp near an area named Prijedor in
Bosnia. He was chief commander of the camp. 78
The indictment states the offense in these terms, and I think
this takes us straight back in history: "Zeljko Meakic intending to
destroy, in whole or in part, the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croate
people as national, ethnic or religious groups was implicit in the
killing of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croates at the Omarska camp,
thereby committing genocide." 179
Meakic is the twenty-second person to be indicted,' and the
first person ever to be indicted, as I've said, on charges of
176 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Former Yugoslavia: Investigating Violations of
International Humanitarian Law and Establishing an International Criminal Tribunal,
18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1191, 1204-07 (1995) (discussing the difficulties that the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia will have due to legal,
practical and political hurdles in prosecuting war crime defendants); see also
Wedgewood, supra note 145, at 269-71 (discussing the practical difficulties in trying to
prosecute war crime defendants due to evidentiary problems).
' See generally William Drozdiak, War Crimes Tribunal Arraigns First Suspect;
Bosnian Pleads Not Guilty to Charges that He Killed Muslims at Detention Camp,
WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 1995, at A31 (discussing the indictment of Dusan Tadic and
indicating thet Zeljko Meakic was the senior commander at the Omarska death camp and
one of the first twenty-two Serbs indicted for crimes against humanity).
178 Id.
179 See generally id.
180 See id. But see Marjorie Miller, UN War Crimes Tribunal Charges 21 Bosnian
Serbs, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1995, at Al (including this suspect among the names of the
twenty-one persons indicted).
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genocide.'' This is evidence that the Yugoslav tribunal is properly in
business. There are huge expectations for this tribunal. I think if I
was Graham Blewitt,8 2 I would feel completely crippled by the
enormous difficulties of what this tribunal must do.
I would like to look at three or four of the very practical
problems which are inherent in conducting international criminal
investigations at this point in time. I'd like to preface that by
reminding us that Yugoslavia has had the misfortune of being in a
sense a laboratory of the international community.' 83 Many of the
things which the international community has done and achieved in
the case of Yugoslavia meant that the approach to the creation of the
Rwandan tribunal could go rather more quickly than it did.' 4
Yugoslavia has been a laboratory in the sense that it has
presented the international community with the challenge of how to
learn, or perhaps to relearn, the ways in which a system of
international justice and international law enforcement can be
constructed and made real.8 5 That has been a relatively slow and
difficult process. I want to look initially at three specific areas: the
question of the difficulty of evidence, the difficulty of investigation
and the difficulty, to which others have referred, of trying defendants
181 Roger Cohen, Tribunal Charges Genocide by Serb, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1995,
at Al ("In the first genocide indictment ever handed down by an international tribunal,
the court charged Zeljko Meakic, the overall commander of the Serbian-run Omarska
camp in northwestern Bosnia, with 'genocide and crimes against humanity."').
11 Graham Blewitt is the deputy prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia. Formerly a war crimes prosecutor in his native Australia,
Blewitt now leads the team of ninety charged with prosecuting war crimes out of the
Balkan conflict. See Franklin, supra note 2, at 30-31.
183 Zacklin, supra note 95, at 279 (observing that The Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia will serve as a model for future international prosecutions).
"84 Id.; see also Steven Coil, In the Shadow of the Holocaust, WASH. POST, Sept.
25, 1994, at WO12 (discussing the role of the Hague Tribunal as a foundation for the
establishment of a permanent U.N. international court of human rights which will have
an immediate impact in Rwanda and all future international conflicts).
11 See Zacklin, supra note 95, at 280 (noting that "[t]he Tribunal will be, at the very
least, an exercise in establishing mechanisms to judge war crimes, and at most an
effective model that may be utilized in the establishment of a permanent tribunal with
a broader criminal jursidiction").
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who are outside the control of the tribunal. 186
The expectations which have been all around the Yugoslav
tribunal, first of all, focused on the question of evidence of war
crimes. People assumed that because there had been very extensive
media and non-governmental organization reporting, that could
seemlessly translate into the hard evidence that was necessary for the
criminal prosecution. The inadequacy of the evidence took the
international community by surprise. The conflict in Bosnia was
never a secret one.' 87 Atrocities were reported daily. 88 In the first
months of the Bosnian conflict the United Nations Protection Force
credited 3000 journalists. They all filed their reports. There was
reporting by the U.N.' 89 and the first U.N.- placed field monitors.
But then suddenly the world had to realize that reporting human
rights was a different matter from proving criminal responsibility.
When the commission of experts, which went out of business last
year, handed over its mandate to the tribunal, it handed over 65,000
pages of documentation containing around 50,000 delegations.
It was the task of the prosecutor's office of Graham Blewitt,
and of those who later joined him, to see whether that information
could be transformed into evidence. I was reading Telford Taylor's
book,"9 and I came across a comment which he made in, I think May
'1 See Bassiouni, supra note 176, at 1204-07 (discussing the evidentiary difficulties
of prosecuting war criminals and the other legal, practical, and political hurdles which
the war tribunal will face in Yugoslavia); Wedgewood, supra note 145, at 269 (noting
evidentiary problems which arise from prosecuting war crimes); Franklin, supra note 2,
at 30-31 (discussing the evidentiary difficulties of prosecuting suspected war criminals
in absentia encountered by Graham Blewitt, Deputy Prosecutor of the War Crimes
Tribunal).
187 See Gideon A. Moor, The Republic of Bosnia-Herzogovia andArticle 51: Inherent
Rights and Unmet Responsibilities, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 870, 897-98 (1995)
("Taking note of the continued reports of human rights atrocities within Bosnia ... the
Security Council expressed alarm at continuing reports of human rights violations.").
"I See, e.g., U.N. Reports Massacre of Bosnian Muslims in Expulsions, WASH.
POST, Oct. 19, 1995, at A35 (reporting about "100 Muslims were killed earlier this
month after resisting Serbs trying to expel them from their homes"); see also Lepper,
supra note 129, at 412 (commenting that "the world was inundated with stories from the
press about the brutality in Bosnia").
189 See, e.g., Croates, Muslims Sign Cease-Fire, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, May
10, 1993, at Al (U.N. observers reporting that "most residents had fled to the hills for
safety ...there have been signs of heavy shelling the past few days").
'90 TAYLOR, supra note 101.
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of 1945, which seemed very apposite. He said, "[o]ur task was...
to prosecute leading Nazis on ... criminal charges ..... The first
question a prosecuting attorney asks ... is '[w]here is the evidence?'
The blunt fact was that [in May 1945], despite what everyone knew
about the Nazi leaders, virtually no judicially admissible evidence was
at hand." 91 This, I think, was the mountain that the relatively small
initial team of prosecutors in the Hague have been having to climb.
They've been having to go through enormous quantities of soft
evidence and try to turn it into evidence which they can put before
the court.
The second problem is that of international investigation.
Normally, when police investigate an offense, they do so in a
language they understand, a culture they know, and in a political or
criminal context with which they are familiar. The tribunals'
investigators' witnesses are scattered in the refugee diaspora.' 92  I
understand that Omarska 93 indictments required travel to no less than
twelve countries, including Malaysia. They have to establish that
there was a murder because they don't have the corpse. They have
to conduct their investigations through interpreters in another country
and at a distance.194 The problem of distance also, of course, means
that in all but one of these indicted cases it's quite unlikely that the
defendant will appear in the court, 95 and the expectations that the
court would now be in full swing as of March of this year seem
relatively unlikely to be realized.
Set against this, I think one has to look at what the tribunal
has achieved. It has drafted and adopted rules of procedure which,
191 Id. at 49.
11 See William W. Home, The Real Trial of the Century, THE AMERCAN LAWYER,
Sept. 1995, at 4, 58 (noting that it can be very difficult for a prosecution team consisting
of people from twenty-nine different cultures to obtain indictments).
193 Omarska was a concentration camp located in the Prijedor district of Bosnia.
Cohen, supra note 181, at Al.
191 See Home, supra note 192, at 60 (observing that if a witness agrees to speak
against an alleged perpetrator, "an interpretor and two investigators must travel from the
tribunal to wherever in Europe the witness is located").
19g See Christiane Amanpour, The Next 50 Years, Part 3 - Crimes of War (CNN
News Transcript 606-3, Oct. 22, 1995) available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS
File (indicating that only one of forty-three people indicted is currently in custody).
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I think, will be model rules of procedure for other tribunals. 196 This
I think is a very important point for the national courts because in the
case of Yugoslavia, and probably in all cases, as Professor Louis
Henkin reminded us this afternoon, the place where the most
prosecutions will take place will be and should be in national courts.
The tribunal, as Graham Blewitt told us, has concurrent
jurisdiction. 197
This means that where a court in one of the successor states
of the former Yugoslavia tries somebody, either on criminal charges
or on war crime charges, the tribunal may decide whether it should
seek to have the case transferred to it to try or to have a completed
case retried in the Hague.198 It can exercise this jurisdiction in a
number of circumstances which are set out in its statute and rules. 199
One of them is where the national proceedings were not impartial,
were not fairly conducted, or were designed to shield the accused
from international responsibility.2° The tribunal can also exercise its
jurisdiction where ordinary criminal charges are brought despite
evidence of war crimes. 
2 1
Now, this is an enormously important part, and the question
is how the tribunal is going to be able to exercise its jurisdiction and
the degree to which this power can enable the tribunal to act as a
96 See Statute of the International Tribunalfor Rwanda, annexed to, S.C. Res. 955,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, 3453 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (stating that "the
Tribunal shall adopt the rules of procedure and evidence already adopted by the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia"); see also Levie, supra note 29, at
3 (noting that the International Tribunal for Rwanda will follow the procedural rules of
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia).
,91 Levie, supra note 29, at 14.
,Id. at 15 (describing the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia).
"9 See generally Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 17, at art. 10, reprinted in 32 .L.M.
at 1177 (specifying the instances in which a defendant may be retried by the tribunal
after a national court prosecution).
296 Id.; see Levie, supra note 29, at 15 (noting that Article 10(2) of the Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia specifies when retrial of a defendant
is permitted).
"I1 Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 17, at art. 10(2)(a), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1177
(stating that a defendant may be tried by the tribunal following a national court trial
when "the act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an ordinary crime");
see Levie, supra note 29, at 15 (commenting generally on retrials under the Statute of
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia).
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supervisory body, not a court of appeal, but a court of reference and
influence, which will set standards throughout the national criminal
institutions of Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and possibly
Macedonia. Speaking practically and in the long-term, this is going
to be of more effective importance than the relatively small number
of cases which the tribunal is going to be able to try in the Hague.
This is not to minimize the importance of these proceedings,
which are going to establish the law. They are going to set standards
and they are going to have very important deterrent effects.20 But
of the hundreds of thousands of war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and acts of genocide which have been committed in the course of the
Yugoslavian conflict, these must be dealt with.20 3 They must be tried
within national courts.
Originally, the tribunal was little known in the former
Yugoslavia.2" One of the reasons for that is that it didn't have the
money to translate its statute and rules, among other things, into
Serbo-Croate.2 °5 This is all changing. I was talking to a journalist
a week ago who is working in the small area of Bosnia, speaking
with local people, and he described the increasing reluctance that
those who he was interviewing felt to talk with him about what had
happened, and he ascribed that reluctance to the fact that suddenly the
tribunal was becoming known.
Now, this may seem something very small, but if someone
believes in the deterrent quality of the effect of prosecution, it is
actually something of considerable importance. What now must
happen is that the tribunal's proceedings in the Hague must be
202 See Stephanie Grant, Yugoslavia: Balkan Image and Hague Reality, Inter. Press
Serv., May 27, 1995, available-in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLNWS File (suggesting
that the tribunal's work should be widely reported to deter future incidents of war
crime).
203 See O'Brien, supra note 78, at 639 (observing that "the victims of atrocities in
the former Yugoslavia deserve justice, as do all those elsewhere who will be protected
by strengthened international humanitarian law").
204 See Grant, supra note 202 (commenting that "the tribunal is largely unknown to
those within its jurisdiction").
205 The working languages of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
are English and French. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 17, at art. 33, reprinted in 32
I.L.M. at 1200.
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reported throughout the former Yugoslavia.20 6 There is a project run
by an institute in London called the Institute of War and Peace
Reporting whereby a Serbo-Croate speaking journalist will be in the
courtroom and will be reporting on a daily basis what is happening
so that this can be published and publicized throughout the media in
the area.
The next important thing is that lawyers, judges, and non-
governmental organizations in the region need to know about the
tribunal. They need to know its statutes; they need to know the laws
being applied; and they then need to be able to press for prosecution
under Yugoslavian rule, because the law of the Social Federation of
Yugoslavia, former Yugoslavia, which has now been incorporated
into the law of all the successive states, contains the Geneva
Convention, the genocide convention and all the laws which are
necessary to conduct prosecutions at the national level.2"7
I think that when I started by saying that I wanted to talk
about expectation and reality, I think it is very important to have high
hopes for these tribunals, but I also think it is important to recognize
the practical reality in which they work. Not to be cast down by
that, but to recognize the practical and real and immediate tasks
which have to be undertaken in order to establish individual
responsibility and to replace collective responsibility by individual
prosecution within national courts and within the region.
PROFESSOR TEITEL: And now Juan has promised to pull all this
together in ten minutes.
Juan Mendez
MR. JUAN MENDEZ: Thank you very much. By mutual accord
with Stephanie, I will concentrate on Rwanda rather than on the
former Yugoslavia and I will do so on the basis of the research that
my colleagues at our African division, formally known as Africa
Watch, have conducted. So I'm not going to attempt to bring
206 See Grant, supra note 202.
201 See Genocide Convention, supra note 53. Article 2 imposes a legal obligation
upon contracting states to prevent and punish genocide. Id.
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everything together.
A man of Tutsi origin is in jail right now in Rwanda and he's
elderly and has difficulty living through the prison experience. He
recently wrote a note to a judicial authority in Rwanda. The basis for
his arrest is complaints that he was actually spared from the genocide
of last year because a man of Hutu origin protected him and that man
of Hutu origin was up to his neck in the killing of fellow Tutsies.
And by one of those sometimes unexplainable things that happens in
a catastrophe of this sort, he apparently saved the life of this man.
That seems to be the only basis for his arrest, and when he
wrote to this judicial authority, he was not asking to be released. He
was borrowing some money and, because of his old age, he could not
find his way to having a place to sit down in a prison in Kigali. In
fact, in that prison and in some others, there's a density of about four
prisoners for every square meter,20 8 and so it is very difficult to sit
down and most of these prisoners are sleeping in shifts.
I don't pretend to say by any means that this case is
representative of the 30,000 people who are in custody in Rwanda.2 °9
By all accounts, many of them may be deservedly in prison, but,
unfortunately, our research shows that this is not a completely
isolated case. We have seen several other cases in which injustices
may be committed in the name of the duty and obligation of the state
of Rwanda to punish the crime of genocide.210
One of the cases that we learned about, and this is an instance
of interference by military authorities with the proper roles of the
judiciary, is a judge last year who actually ordered the release of
about twenty-two accused persons because he did not find, under the
laws of Rwanda, that the conditions existed for them to remain in
I See Central Africa Faces New Refugee Crisis, UPI, Mar. 31, 1995, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File [hereinafter Central Africa] (quoting the Red
Cross which observed that "[p]risons have become so overcrowded that ... detainees
must share a square meter of floor space with four to six inmates").
29 Id. The Red Cross indicates that there are some 30,000 prisoners in 135
detention centers throughout Rwanda. Id.
21 See, e.g., Julian Bedford, Inmates Threaten Breakout from Jam-Packed Jails,
Reuters Ltd., Apr. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File
(reporting that more than 30,000 prisoners are crowded into jails that were built to house
only 5000).
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preventive detention.2 ' These people were released but were
immediately rearrested by the military authorities in the region and
the judge himself subsequently disappeared.212
I am telling this horror story not to disparage the effort, but
on the contrary, to point out that the effort of the Rwandan
government to prosecute and punish is in serious jeopardy unless
these abuses can be stopped. And it is difficult to see them stop any
time soon when there are now more than 30,000 people in custody;2 13
about 15,000 of them, about half, were arrested in the first six
months of this present government's existence, 1 4 and more than half
of them were arrested only in the last three months.2"5 At this rate,
the new arrests are about 1500 a week.21 6 Under those conditions, it
becomes understandable that many injustices will be committed.
In fact, extrinsically, the Ministry of Justice itself considers
that about twenty percent of those people who are in custody have no
reason to be in custody today in Rwanda. 1" Our monitoring staff,
111 See Rwanda-Berundi: Countries Urged to Act as New Killings Loom, Inter. Press
Serv., Apr. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File. The facts
indicate that 80 prisoners were authorized to be set free as ordered by the judge.
Subsequently, they were arrested by the military. Id. Justice Gratein Ruhorahoza was
determined to be missing shortly thereafter. Id.
2"2 Id. Justice Ruhorahoza was taken away by government soldiers after posting the
names of 80 prisoners he scheduled for release. Id.
213 See Elif Kaban, Rwanda Pledges To Do More To Heal Ethnic Rifts, Reuters News
Serv., Nov. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File [hereinafter
Rwanda Pledges] (jails packed with 57,000 Hutus); ElifKaban, Rwanda: Red Cross Says
2330 Die in Rwandan Jails, Reuters News Serv., Oct. 29, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, WIRES File [hereinafter Red Cross] (estimating prison population at
40,000); see also supra note 210.
214 See The Crises in Rwanda and Berundi Are Not Over Yet, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 19, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, PAPERS File (estimating
15,000 arrests).
25 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1996, at 41 (discussing
arrest and imprisonment statistics for Rwanda).
216 See Central Africa, supra note 208 (reporting that overcrowding in Rwandanjails
is caused by an addition of approximately 1500 prisoners a week); Rwanda Pledges,
supra note 213 (estimating 1000 weekly arrests on suspicion of involvement in
genocide).
27 See Scott Peterson, Rwanda Prisons Are Swamped by 'War Criminals,' THE
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File
(noting that "[the Ministry of Justice admits that some people are held wrongly" but
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which is currently in Rwanda, has heard of the emergence of accusers
on demand that, for the appropriate fee, can act as an accuser before
any police or military authority and can have somebody who they
don't like, or for whatever other reason, arrested.
There have been deaths in custody.2" 8 You must have read
about the March tragedy when people suffocated to death.2"9 There
the Rwandan authorities appropriately exercised their duty to
investigate and punish these serious crimes. Those who were
responsible for not opening the cell door so that these people would
not die have been arrested22° and they hopefully will be prosecuted.
That willingness to prosecute their own will do a lot of good in
legitimatizing Rwanda's effort and in ensuring support by the
international community for this effort.22" '
But, on the other hand, there is an estimate of about 1000
deaths in custody in these nine months,222 and this is the only case
that we know of where there has been some appropriate response.
As I said, the prison conditions are appalling.223 The International
does not offer actual percentages of those wrongly detained).
2I Elif Kaban, Human Rights Fears Surround Rwanda Refugee Influx, Reuters, Nov.
30, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File (noting that 2300 inmates
have died in jails overcrowded with 60,000 genocide suspects); Rwanda: About 1,000
Inmates Die in Less Than A Year in Overcrowded Gitarama Prison, BBC Monitoring
Serv., July 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File (noting that
about 1000 inmates had died over the past nine or 10 months at Gitarama prison); see
Rwanda: More Detention Centres for Rwanda, Reuters News Serv., Oct. 4, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File ("The Red Cross says some 1,000
inmates died so far this year of dysentery and malaria in Gitarama.").
29 See Bedford, supra note 210 (observing that "22 people suffocated to death in a
police station cell on the outskirts of Kigali as they waited to be transferred to the
capital's already jam-packed central prison").
2 See Twenty-Two Prisoners Suffocate to Death in Rwandan Jail, Agence France-
Press, Mar. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File (reporting that
an official and the guards who locked the detainees in the room have been arrested).
22 See Not Since Nuremberg, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1994, at C8 (questioning
whether "leading supects will escape prosecution by virtue of their bargaining power as
political leaders").
222 See supra footnote 218.
223 See Kenya: Hundreds Dead in Rwanda's Appalling Prisons, Reuters, Sept. 26,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File (characterizing Rwanda's
prisons as "appalling"); Red Cross, supra note 213 (observing that 2300 inmates have
died from disease).
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Committee of the Red Cross that monitors prison conditions has
warned publicly of the possibility of an outbreak of serious illness
because of these conditions that, under any circumstance, amount to
cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment. There are also problems
with due process. 24 Of all the people who are in custody in the
region of Kigali, there are about 7000 people in custody, 25 only
about 1500 have even appeared before a magistrate once.226 Some
months ago a liberation committee was formed. 227  The liberation
committee was supposed to review each case. We applauded the
measure, and we supported it. Unfortunately, pretty soon the
liberation committee included members of the secret services and
even members of the liberation committee itself complained that the
presence of secret police members in the liberation committee was
inappropriate. Even so, the liberation committee saw about 100
cases, and of those, ordered the release of fifty-eight and in some of
those cases the people holding them didn't even comply with the
liberation committee's request.
228
There is no question that the government of Rwanda is trying
to live up to its duty. Actually the government of Rwanda has done
more than the rest of the international community has done to prevent
and punish the crime of genocide.229 My concerns, as I have just
224 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1996, at 40 (observing that nearly
57,000 people are being detained in Rwandan prisons under conditions which violate the
due process guarantees of Rwandan law).
22 See Rwanda: About 1000 Inmates Die in Less Than a Year in Overcrowded
Gitarama Prison, BBC Monitoring Serv., July 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLNWS File (noting that Gitarama is "the worst prison where 7000 inmates
are crammed into space built for 400").
226 Cf. Kenya: U.N. Agency Empties Warehousesfor Rwanda Inmates, Reuters News
Serv., Aug. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File ("Rwanda's
judiciary has been paralyzed since the end of three months of civil war and genocide last
year and is unable to process detainees because of a lack of magistrates and funds.").
227 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1996, at 41-42 (discussing the
creation of a "selection commission" to review the cases of prison detainees).
228 C. id. (explaining that the few persons who were released "were only
provisionally at liberty and had not been cleared of the charges against them" and others
were attacked or killed).
229 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, 3453 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994) (recognizing Rwanda's interest and repeated requests for an
international tribunal).
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expressed them, go to the necessary legitimacy of the effort and not
to the effort itself.
There should be no equivalence between the abuses that
present state agents in Rwanda commit with the genocide that was
committed last year and my criticism is by no means intended to
provide that equivalence. I very strongly reject that. But again,
current abuses have to be dealt with, and the government has to show
its willingness to try their own, just as it is willing to try the enemy
or the enemy of its people. In that regard, the first task, the most
urgent task, is to rebuild the judiciary.230 It has been said before
today, but I would say within rebuilding the judiciary, the first and
most urgent task is to rebuild a certain function within the judiciary
by which magistrates can examine the charges against every detainee,
to do so expeditiously, but at least with some form of due process,
so that these unfair cases may be dealt with soon. Those who have
to remain in prison because, their prima facie evidence of their
involvement in crime should then remain in prison but under
appropriate prison conditions.23'
I'm not going to dwell on domestic trials in the former
Yugoslavia, but I do want to refer you to a couple of reports that we
have done about those trials in different states of the former
Yugoslavia. By our account, very few, if any, of those trials live up
to any serious scrutiny under international human rights norms. But,
as I said before, it is not only the government of Rwanda and
certainly not only the government of the former Yugoslavia that has
the responsibility to prosecute and punish these crimes.232
So what has been the record of other domestic jurisdictions
230 A rebuilding of the judiciary has already begun. See Rwanda: Rwanda Sets up
Supreme Court in Big Step to Justice, Reuters News Serv., Oct. 12, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File (noting that "[tihe Rwandan government has
appointed a new Supreme Court in the first major step towards rebuilding its justice
system destroyed by last year's genocide").
23 See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORTS OF KILLINGS AND
ABDUCTIONS BY THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC ARMY, APR.-AUG. 1994, at 12 (1994)
(making recommendation to the Rwandan government to improve treatment of prisoners
and preventitive detention procedures).
232 Cf. Dusan Cotic, A Critical Study of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia: Introductory Remark, 5 CRIM. L.F. 223, 231 (1994) (suggesting that "the
world community" has an obligation to prevent war crimes).
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that have some responsibility, either to try to extradite, or in the case
of the ad hoc tribunals that have been created, at least to transfer
those prisoners to the appropriate jurisdiction? In France, where
presently there are apparently many former Rwandese culprits of the
genocide, the government has shown no willingness whatsoever to
investigate them.233
1. In Belgium and in Switzerland the evidence is a little more
encouraging. 234  At least there are some serious efforts to gather
evidence against people who may be there. Canada has decided to
forgo trial and is instead using its immigration law to deport someone
involved in the genocide. 235  As far as other African nations, in
Kenya and Tanzania there has been very little effort.236 In South
Africa, the government recently gave asylum to someone involved in
arms traffic that provided arms to the former government of
Rwanda; 237 arms that helped commit the genocide. In addition, Zaire
in fact is cooperating to rearm the militia and perhaps contribute to
create another outburst of the genocide.238
233 See Robert Block, Bickering Delays Start of Rwanda Genocide Tribunal; France
Is Believed To Be Behind Efforts to Hinder Prosecution of Suspected War Criminals, THE
INDEPENDENT, Nov. 2, 1994, at 12 (noting that "[h]uman rights groups and international
organizations believed that France is behind efforts to hinder the prosecution of
Rwanda's former leaders").
234 See Governments Need to Arrest More Genocide Criminals, Agence France-
Presse, Sept. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File (noting that
"Belgium, France, Switzerland and Canada have taken action against a handful of
suspects").
235 See Rwanda: Radio Says Canada and Cameroon Ready To Extradite Alleged
Criminals, BBC Monitoring Serv., June 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
TXTNWS File (noting that Canadian authorities arrested and extradited Leon Mugesera,
believed to have been instrumental in the Rwandan genocide).
23 See Chris Mcgreal, Rwanda Tribunal Chief Struggles To Win Funds; Investigators
Hampered in Effort To Compile Evidence of Genocide, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 1995,
at 11 (discussing the need to deal with uncooperative governments such as Kenya "which
is openly hostile and sheltering some of the former Hutu leaders eventually expected to
be charged with genocide").
237 See generally U.N. To Probe Arms Flow to Former Rwanda Troops, Reuters N.
Am. Wire, Sept. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File
(discussing the flow of weapons to former Rwanda troops).
238 See id. (noting that "the architects of Rwanda's genocide were rearming
themselves in preparation for an attempt to return to power, aided by France, Zaire and
South America").
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The other part of the international community's response has
been the creation of a special war crime tribunal, an ad hoc war
crime tribunal for Rwanda.239 It should never be seen as an
alternative to domestic prosecutions.240 I think some of the
misunderstandings between the Rwandan government and the
international community at the time of the debate at the United
Nations had to do with what was perceived as an attempt to bar
Rwanda from living up to its obligation under international law. In
some instances, the war crime tribunal was seen as an alternative to
the domestic prosecutions. The Rwandan government had a right to
protest that. I think those things have been cleared up, but the
misunderstanding was real.
But we have heard before that there's been very little
cooperation. We were encouraged with the nomination of Honore
Rakotomanana, the prosecutor from Madagascar, 24 because just as
in the case of Justice Goldstone,242 their nominations for the
prosecutorial job are a sign that these things are taken seriously.
However, as of today, the prosecutor for Rwanda has only about a
staff of five, and that is certainly not enough for the task. 243 Time is
not on our side. It is not on the side of the war crimes tribunal and
it is not on the side of the Rwandan government because the more
that these delays occur, the more that there will be injustices
committed and the more the legitimacy of both efforts, the
239 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, 3453 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994) (establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda); see Akhavan, supra note
114, at 237 (observing that the Security Council established "ad hoc international penal
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as enforcement measures").
240 See Akhavan, supra note 114, at 245-46 (stating that even if prosecutions are
successful, "international tribunals are not a substitute for the necessary action to prevent
genocide").
241 See U.N. Appoints Prosecutorfor Rwandan Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15. 1995,
at A6.
242 Richard Goldstone is the chief prosecutor for both the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia and the International Tribunal for Rwanda. Tomuschat, supra
note 11, at 240; William Drozdiak, Top Serbs Charged with War Crimes, WASH. POST,
July 26, 1995, at Al.
243 As of January 23, 1996, this has changed slightly. See International Tribunal:
Short on Means andLong on Rwandan Impatience, Agence France-Press, Jan. 23, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File (commenting that the prosecutor for
Rwanda has a team of forty).
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international and the domestic one, will suffer.
Comparatively, it should be a lot easier to do the job in
Rwanda than in the former Yugoslavia. 2  But the human rights
monitors, for example, that the United Nations deployed are not, as
far as we can tell, providing for a particularly important service in
gathering the evidence that would be necessary.245
I would like to finish with a comment on U.S. policy that has
been very, very helpful in regards to both war crime tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Ambassador Albright has shown
exceptional leadership in insisting on the seriousness of this effort and
has been the greatest ally that we have in ensuring that these tribunals
will not be sacrificed for the expediency of a misunderstood wave of
dealing with peace issues.246
But, on the other hand, it is kind of puzzling that the United
States does not support the international criminal court.247 Although
it is not couched in those terms, we have looked carefully at the
arguments made by the United States in the debate in the United
Nations about the international criminal court, and without getting
into details right now, I don't think they can be justified or explained
as only an effort to improve on a draft. 24' The U.S. position in this
regard can only be understood as an effort to punt, to deiay, or
244 Contra Tomuschat, supra note 11, at 242, 243 (commenting that the task faced
by the International Tribunal for Rwanda is more difficult than that faced by the Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia).
241 See World Tribunal on Rwanda Killings Urged, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Sept. 19, 1994,
at A17 (noting that "[tlhe UN has promised to set up a war tribunal and pledged about
150 human rights monitors to Rwanda. However, only a handful as yet have been
sent.").
246 See Lepper, supra note 129, at 413 (commenting that Ambassador Albright was
a leader in pressing the Security Council to address the commission of war crimes). See
generally Zacklin, supra note 95, at 281 (observing that the political will and support of
member states are necessary to the success of the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia).
247 The United States has voted against a draft resolution to create a permanent
international criminal court citing disgreements with the breadth of such a court's
jurisdiction as provided in the draft. See,e.g., John F. Harris, Clinton Pushes for U.N.
War Crimes Tribunal, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1995, at A4 (stating that "[t]he United
States has opposed a draft for a permanent tribunal, pending at the United Nations
because the administration wants such a body to have a narrow mandate so that it must
have approval from [the] U.N. Security Council to pursue the cases.").
24 See generally id.
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worse, to kill the effort altogether. 49
There is also some effort that we, those of us in the non-
governmental community can make. We have also been slow to
react. We can also help gather information. OWe have established
a small presence in Rwanda of a permanent nature and we are
working with local domestic human rights organizations in trying to
assist in gathering evidence, while at the same time insisting on a
very rigorous observance of due process rights. 2 ° There have been
many exhumations and, unfortunately, the exhumations have not been
done with a view of preserving evidence so that it can be used in
trial.2"' But there is expertise in the non-governmental organization
community, and we hope it will be used eventually to do so.
I want to finish simply with what is at least intended to be a
warning note. The delays and inordinate lack of serious support for
the ideal of accountability for what has happened in Rwanda is
conspiring against all of us. It is conspiring against the legitimacy of
the effort of the Rwandan government, but it will be laid on our own
lap, not only on the government of Rwanda. It will be seen as a lack
of interest displayed by the international community at the time when
the genocide was happening.252 The increasing violence that one can
expect to happen in Burundi or perhaps even in Rwanda itself will be
249 See Daniel P. Jones & Katherine Farrish, Clinton Backs Permanent World Court;
Stance Reverses Longtime U.S. Policy, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 17, 1995, at Al
(quoting a retired international prosecutor at Nuremberg as saying that "the United States
has been and is dragging its heels" on the issue of establishing a permanent court). But
see Harris, supra note 247, at A4 (reporting President Clinton as expressing commitment
to a permanent international criminal court).
I See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1996, at 44 (discussing
the presence of Human Rights Watch/Africa and other human rights organizations in
Rwanda); Update on Developments in Rwanda and Burundi, DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH,
April 17, 1995, Vol. 6, no. 16 (1995) (describing the United States involvement with
Rwanda).
1' Cf. Donatella Lorch, Rwanda Calls for Others To Join Massacre Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 1995, at 12 (stating that bodies have been exhumed for the purpose of
controlling Rwanda's negative image and not for the purpose of preserving evidence to
be used at trial).
25 See Akhavan, supra note 114, at 246 (arguing that "[tihe Rwandan Tribunal
cannot adequately compensate for inaction on the part of the international community").
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another very serious blow to this step into accountability.253
I don't want to sound terribly gloomy. I think we can, we
meaning all of us, the whole world, can still salvage this effort. But
time is running short and there are steps in the wrong direction that
we need to correct very quickly. Thank you.
PROFESSOR TEITEL: I want to thank all the panelists. You have
been a very patient audience and we are about to enjoy some wine
and a more informal exchange. I promised the Ambassador a minute
to respond to some of the more controversial points made, but it has
to be brief.
AMBASSADOR BAKURAMUTSA: I thank our friend from Human
Rights Watch very much. What he said is the truth. Our
government does not deny that people are in prison and dying in
prison. However, as he has said himself, there has been for a while
a very big misunderstanding between my country and the U.N.
regarding the international tribunal.
In the meantime, while Rwanda was negotiating with the
U.N., many people were arrested and put in prison because we
estimated about 30,000 people were responsible for the deaths of the
approximately one million people who lost their lives.254 So as a
means of preventitive detention, to avoid any violence in the street,
my government started to arrest people.255 It is true that some of the
people are innocent, but how do we know who they are? Our
judicial system has been destroyed and is only now being rebuilt.
What else can the government do? It can either arrest the
people or let them go in the street and probably be killed by some
member of a family wanting to avenge their relatives who have been
killed. Given this choice, my government has chosen to arrest
" See Susan Litherland, Burundi: NGOS Mobilise to Prevent Repetition of Rwanda
Genocide, Inter. Press Serv., Feb. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File ("The fear that Burundi could become central to Africa's next killing
ground has promoted non-governmental organizations from around the world to form a
plan of action to stop the escalation of violence between Tutsis and Hutus.").
' See, e.g., Helen Signy, Rwanda: Rwandans Die in Crowded Jails, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, April 15, 1995, at 13.
15 Bedford, supra note 210 (indicating the arrest and imprisonment of approximately
30,000 persons in Rwanda).
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people.
Now, the country has been destroyed. This is the reason why
we need support from the international community, not with the
prison, but to put together a judicial system and then the problems
can be solved. The innocent people will be set free and the guilty
ones can be forgiven or punished. But really what you have said is
true. My government has no choice though. We cannot let the
suspects remain at large because that could create another killing
system by the people of Rwanda themselves. So we put these people
in prison.
The prison conditions are poor just as many citizens' own
homes are poor. Since the countryside is poor you can imagine that
the prison will be poor. Poverty is another problem in the country.
We really need international support. If we don't have it, we will
have to do it ourselves with the means we have. I thank you very
much.
Audience Questions
PROFESSOR TEITEL: I will take one question.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is directed to Mr. O'Brien, the
only panelist who mentioned genocide by name. Does the United
States government formally recognize what continues to take place in
Bosnia as constituting genocide as defined in Article 2 of the
Genocide Convention?256 If not, what specific, discernible disparity
has the United States government, or Madeleine Albright herself,
I The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
defines "genocide" as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Genocide Convention, supra note 53.
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found between the reality of what was taking place and that which
constitutes genocide which, in effect, takes us off the hook from
preventing genocide as prescribed by Article 1 of the Genocide
Convention?25 7 If the United States does recognize the activity as
genocide, has our response to date been consistent with our Article
1 pledge to prevent genocide?
MR. O'BRIEN: Two parts. One, yes, it's genocide, and yes, we
have said that publicly.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The United States Government said it
publicly?
MR. O'BRIEN: Yes, consistently since early 1993, which was the
time we first pulled things together. Warren Christopher said there
were acts of genocide there.258 A controversy emerged about his use
of the phrase "acts of," a controversy I never understood, on either
side.25 9 Then in June of 1993 he said yes, it was genocide. 2" In
June of 1994, he said it publicly in hearings.261 I think it was the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, now renamed the House
International Relations Committee.
Now, as far as what the genocide convention means, I think
the consistent position of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Senate, not
just this administration, but every administration to consider ratifying
the Genocide Convention, is that Article 1 does not establish any
obligation outside the territory of the party to the convention. So our
obligation is to prevent genocide within the United States. Beyond
zs Article I of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the crime of
Genocide states that "[t]he Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed
in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they
undertake to prevent and punish." Id.
258 Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Troop Withdrawal Ends Frustrating Mission To Save
Rwandan Lives, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1994, at All.
259 Border Reform Plan Introduced, THE FRESNO BEE, Feb. 4, 1994, at A6 ("A
veteran foreign service officer has charged that Secretary of State Warren Christopher
repeatedly rejected characterizations of the Serb War on Bosnia as 'genocide,' as part
of an effort to avoid taking stronger action.").
260 Lippman, supra note 258.
261 Id.
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that, every United States administration from the negotiators on
through over the last fifty years says we have no territorial
obligation. So I think the second part of your question is based upon
a falsehood.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So, in other words, you're saying because
genocide is taking place across the border in some other territory, we
are not legally obligated to prevent it?
MR. O'BRIEN: That's what the Convention means. I'm saying that's
what the convention means. It establishes no such legal obligation.
PROFESSOR TEITEL: I'd like to thank everyone who came and our
panelists throughout the day. One point that has been signaled
throughout all of these comments is the importance of political will
for sustaining these efforts in the pursuit of law in the service of
justice and accountability, and these conferences and debates and the
litigation and the writing and the efforts of students and lawyers are
critical in that endeavor, and so I want to thank you for your
attendance and cooperation.
(Whereupon, the Fifth Annual Ernst C. Stiefel Symposium:
1945-1995: Critical Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trials and State
Accountability concluded at 6:45 p.m.)
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